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THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOSTAGE 
IN TRADE RETALIATION 
SARAH R. WASSERMAN RAJEC* 
ABSTRACT 
 Intellectual property law has become bound up in a debate about 
appropriate remedies for violations of the World Trade Organiza-
tion Agreement.  As an alternative to traditional countermeasures 
that consist of retaliation under the violated agreement, the World 
Trade Organization “(WTO”) contemplates that violations of one 
of its covered agreements may be remedied through “cross-retali-
ation,” or retaliation under another agreement.  One form of 
cross-retaliation has garnered interest in recent years: the threat 
to suspend intellectual property rights in response to unrelated 
trade violations. 
 Cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights suspension 
is theoretically appealing for its potential to avoid problems inher-
ent in traditional retaliatory countermeasures—often tariff in-
creases.  Cross-retaliation appears attractive because its strength 
as a remedy is theoretically dependent on the value of the intellec-
tual property rights at stake, rather than the political or economic 
strength of the complaining country. Proponents suggest it will 
solve power differential problems at the WTO while encouraging 
compliance. 
 Missing from the conversation about cross-retaliation are (1) an 
assessment of its effectiveness in cases where it has been approved, 
and (2) an advocate for what I call the “IP hostage” of trade re-
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taliation—that is, an account of the potential costs that may ac-
company threats to intellectual property rights.  This account is 
useful in explaining why cross-retaliation has not been as effective 
as its proponents have suggested it would be.  This Article fills the 
gap in the literature by providing case studies of the instances in 
which the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has approved intellectual 
property rights suspension as a means of trade retaliation.  Based 
on these case studies, this Article argues that cross-retaliation may 
be a useful tool in some, limited circumstances, but generally suf-
fers from many of the same problems as traditional retaliatory 
measures, particularly as they relate to developing countries with 
smaller economies.  Moreover, this Article argues that the unique 
characteristics of intellectual property rights make it particularly 
difficult to carry out a threat of cross-retaliation through intellec-
tual property rights suspension.  Taking intellectual property 
rights hostage will not solve problems inherent in the remedial 
scheme for trade violations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement (“WTO Agreement”)1 establishing the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is notable for its near-worldwide mem-
bership, sweeping scope, and the strong remedies it provides in the event of 
an uncured breach.2  In addition to lowering tariffs even further below those 
agreed to through the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”),3 the WTO Agreement extends beyond tariff rates to address non-
tariff barriers to trade.  Non-tariff barriers to trade encompassed by the WTO 
include areas of regulation traditionally seen as the domain of local govern-
ments.  For example, the WTO Agreement includes agreements on trade in 
services, sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, and—perhaps most 
controversially—intellectual property.4  The dispute settlement process and 
remedies provided for under the WTO, moreover, responded to one of the 
main critiques of other international agreements: that they lack means of en-
forcement.5  The Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”)6 sets up a pro-
cess for resolving disputes between WTO member countries and, when that 
                                                          
 1.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154–55 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 2.  Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization in 2020, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 167, 
167–68, 172 (2005); Mark Wu, Rethinking the Temporary Breach Puzzle: A Window on the Future 
of International Trade Conflicts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 95, 152 (2015) (describing the strength of the 
dispute settlement system, stemming from its “compulsory jurisdiction, detailed procedural rules, a 
formalized appellate review process, and the possibility of sanctions”).  
 3.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
 4.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [here-
inafter TRIPS]. 
 5.  See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 333, 
336 (1999) (“[D]ispute resolution is not simply a mechanism for neutral application of legislated 
rules but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of governance.”). 
 6. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22.3, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
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fails, approval of retaliatory countermeasures for ongoing violations by the 
WTO itself—typically through retaliation under the same agreement that was 
violated.7  Its enforcement measures have made the WTO one of the strongest 
international agreements currently in force.8  At the same time, the enforce-
ment measures have been critiqued for perpetuating economic and power im-
balances among countries due to structural aspects of remedies that make 
them less functional for small or economically weak countries.  In particular, 
the measures frustrate economically weaker countries’ ability to benefit from 
effective remedies because the imposition of retaliatory remedies may not 
impact the violator country and may instead harm the complaining country.9  
This disadvantage adds to the difficulties economically weaker countries al-
ready face in using the WTO to seek enforcement due to the high cost of the 
action.10  Scholars, practitioners, and member countries have recently turned 
towards another allowable remedial scheme to circumvent these problems—
cross-retaliation.11 
The WTO Agreement has garnered attention both for its inclusion of the 
DSU and for the broad scope of activities covered by the agreement in addi-
tion to tariffs.  These two characteristics combine in Article 22 of the DSU 
                                                          
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and Interna-
tional Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 266 (2011); Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Reme-
dies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 H. J. INT’L L. 
337, 337 (2007) (discussing how the WTO remedial scheme differs from those of other international 
treaties). 
 9.  See infra Section I.B. 
 10.  Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adap-
tation, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 177 (2006) (discussing costs of bringing challenges for smaller de-
veloping countries); Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Sys-
tem: Why It Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT 167, 182 (Frontiers of Eco-
nomics and Globalization, Ser. No. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Shaffer, Developing Country]. 
 11.  See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking 
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2011) (suggesting the “ben-
eficial effects that trade retaliation in intellectual property can have for developing countries”); 
Arvind Subramanian and Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS Serve as an Enforcement Device for Devel-
oping Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 403 (arguing for the use of cross-retaliation); 
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Suspending IP Obligations Under TRIPS: A Viable Alternative to En-
force Prevailing WTO Rulings?, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L., 1 (April 2008); Frederick M. Abbott, 
Cross-retaliation in TRIPS: Issues of Law and Practice, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 
OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 536 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010) 
(“Attention is increasingly focusing on the possibility of developing members suspending conces-
sions relating to intellectual property rights . . . as a means to induce compliance by developed mem-
bers.”).  In addition, a group of countries has proposed making it easier for developing countries to 
pursue cross-retaliation following a finding of a WTO violation.  Negotiations on the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding: Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries Proposals on 
DSU, WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/19 (Oct. 9, 2002). 
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to allow for cross-retaliation.  This provision allows retaliation against coun-
tries found to be in continued noncompliance with the WTO through suspen-
sion of concessions under any WTO treaty, even those concessions not im-
plicated in the dispute.12  This remedy stands in contrast to conventional 
countermeasures under the DSU that allow for retaliation under the violated 
agreement only.  For example, conventional countermeasures would allow a 
complaining country to raise tariffs on beef imports to counter a noncompli-
ant country’s unfair tariffs on its poultry.  Under WTO Article 22, however, 
a complaining country is permitted to suspend concessions under a different 
agreement than the one that was the subject of the initial violation.  The op-
tion to cross-retaliate has recently gained traction among scholars, practition-
ers, and advocates, particularly those arguing on behalf of developing coun-
tries.13  Moreover, countries complaining of a WTO violation find suspension 
of intellectual property (“IP”) rights under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) to be a particularly attrac-
tive option because it hits the violator country where it hurts and is a seem-
ingly low-cost option to the complaining country.14 
In addition to debates about the unequal availability of the dispute set-
tlement system to developing countries, there is a debate about what the ulti-
mate aim of the system is: compliance, compensation, or a minimization of 
breach.  Scholars and advocates have debated whether countermeasures au-
thorized by the WTO’s DSU are meant to—and, moreover, whether they 
ought to—induce compliance by the offender or compensate industries for 
their harms (thereby allowing for something analogous to “efficient breach” 
in contract law).  One view is that countermeasures ought to induce compli-
ance, therefore justifying strong remedies and counseling an increased reli-
ance on cross-retaliation.15  The other view is that remedies are meant to be 
                                                          
 12.  DSU, supra note 6; Sebastian, supra note 8, at 340–41 (describing the process for seeking 
remedies). 
 13.  See supra note 11.  
 14.  See infra Part I.D.  
 15.  See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstanding on 
the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 60–63 (1997) (noting that WTO members 
are legally obligated to comply with the findings of dispute proceedings and thus specific perfor-
mance is required of members); Marco Bronckers & Freya Baetens, Reconsidering Financial Rem-
edies in WTO Dispute Settlement, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 281, 291 (2013) (arguing that compliance is 
the main purpose of remedies because it allows for “security and predictability” of the multilateral 
trading system, consistent with DSU Art. 3 (2)); Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 1 (“Given the imbal-
ances in trade and economic power amongst WTO Members, the central issue is whether suspending 
TRIPS obligations can do a significantly better job than traditional retaliation in facilitating com-
pliance by powerful WTO Members.”); see also William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51, 68 (1988) (suggesting that enforcement is the principal goal of the dispute 
settlement system in GATT). 
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commensurate with the harm imposed on a complaining country, thereby al-
lowing for breach of WTO commitments in some situations.16  The WTO has 
not historically allowed for financial damages as a remedy for breach of the 
agreement.  However, recent strategic use of cross-retaliation suggests its 
ability to serve as a pathway to de facto financial penalty payments—or, as 
Rachel Brewster describes it, cross-retaliation allows parties to “bargain to 
mutually agreed resolutions of disputes that are less than full compliance.”17 
A recent set of cross-retaliation cases gives insight into this practice and 
puts a new spin on a well-tread debate about appropriate sanctions for WTO 
violations.18  In both cases, intellectual property rights suspension was ap-
proved by the WTO’s dispute settlement body, but in neither case have the 
complaining countries made good on their threats, despite the continuation 
of violations.19  In the first, Antigua and Barbuda received authorization to 
suspend copyright protection against U.S. rights-holders as a means of retal-
iation against the United States’ anti-racketeering laws and prohibitions on 
online gambling.20  The United States’ laws were found to be in violation of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).21  Despite many 
threats, however, Antigua has not suspended its protection of copyrights.  Nor 
have the countries reached a settlement.  The U.S. laws remain in place, and 
Antigua continues to enforce the copyrights of U.S. rights-holders.  The sec-
ond case, involving Brazil, is a contrast.  Brazil received authorization to sus-
pend patent rights in certain pharmaceutical patents owned by U.S. compa-
nies as a remedy for continued violations of the WTO and subsidies 
agreements by the United States in its cotton industry.22  The United States 
made some changes to its agricultural subsidy program, but remains in vio-
lation of the WTO.  However, Brazil has not followed through on its threat.  
                                                          
 16.  Gene M. Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, ‘Optimal’ Retaliation in the WTO—A Commentary 
on the Upland Cotton Arbitration, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 133, 150–51 (2011) (noting that the 
“equivalence” standard for determining countermeasures is not consistent with a compliance-induc-
ing purpose); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal 
Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 245 (2011); 
Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational Sanctions, 
54 HARV. INT’L L. J. 259, 265 (2013)..  
 17.  Brewster, supra note 16, at 288. 
 18.  See infra Part II.  
 19.  Arbitrator Decision, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); Arbitrator Decision, 
United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 6.3, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009). 
 20.  Arbitrator Decision, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.2, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); see also discussion 
infra Section III.B. 
 21.  General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]. 
 22.  Arbitrator Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 6.3, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009); see also discussion infra Section III.C. 
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Instead, the United States recently entered a financial settlement with Brazil, 
paying $300 million to the Brazilian Cotton Institute.23  The threat of intel-
lectual property rights suspension resulted in a financial settlement for Brazil, 
but in the case of Antigua—nothing. 
These cases raise serious questions about the premise that cross-retalia-
tion induces compliance or that it may be a pathway to greater access to pro-
tected goods for citizens in developing countries.  They also demonstrate the 
difficulty of crafting remedies that provide an appropriate measure of or com-
pensation for damages, suggesting that cross-retaliation may be useful as a 
means of reaching this goal, but in far fewer circumstances than others have 
suggested.  Instead, the cases demonstrate that threats to intellectual property 
rights suffer from many of the same drawbacks as other forms of remedies 
when there are large economic disparities between the parties.  The minimal 
benefits derived through cross-retaliation can be better understood by explor-
ing the considerable costs associated with moving from a threat of suspension 
to actual suspension of intellectual property rights. 
The cost of cross-retaliation through suspension of intellectual property 
rights is generally treated as a footnote by those discussing the potential ben-
efits of such a system, as are the potential costs to innovation of threatening 
such suspension.  After all, if cross-retaliation remains a mere threat and is 
never implemented, perhaps that cost is minimal.  However, a full account of 
the value of cross-retaliation demands more.  Cross-retaliation deputizes in-
novative industries to represent a global interest in WTO compliance, which 
is costly to the industry and ineffective, since the industries are in fact self-
interested.  The increased global harmonization of intellectual property laws 
is driven by the goals of decreasing barriers to trade and increasing invest-
ment in innovation.  However, cross-retaliation allows complaining countries 
to suspend intellectual property rights, frustrating that interest.  If threats of 
suspension become more frequent, they may result in lower investment in in-
novative industries.  Admittedly, this Article argues that implementation of 
cross-retaliation is unlikely, and explores the reasons why.  Nevertheless, it 
is worth detailing the potential costs of such retaliatory measures on the the-
ory that the more frequent threats of cross-retaliation become, the more likely 
that IP rights suspension will be imposed at some point.  Even for those who 
think global intellectual property rights are too strong, actual suspension 
through cross-retaliation would be a blunt and poorly-aimed instrument with 
which to target strong intellectual property laws.24 
                                                          
 23.  Mem. Of Understanding Related to the Cotton Dispute (WT/DS267) entered into by the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federative Republic of 
Brazil (Oct. 1, 2014), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/20141001201606893.pdf. 
 24.  See infra Part III.B.  
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Moreover, this exploration of the potential costs of intellectual property 
rights-suspension highlights the characteristics that distinguish it from other 
retaliatory measures, providing insight into why it is so rarely implemented.  
Importantly, there are practical difficulties associated with implementing 
cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights suspension.  First, as 
more companies operate as global enterprises, it is difficult to identify the 
holders of intellectual property rights that are from an offending country, 
which makes the threat less effective.  In addition, to benefit from intellectual 
property rights suspension, countries must have an industry that is suffi-
ciently strong to be able to infringe in ways that benefit the domestic market 
and be willing to do so, despite the risk that the authorization will be with-
drawn if and when the offending country brings its laws back into compli-
ance.  None of these criticisms are insurmountable, but each deserves atten-
tion, particularly given the unlikely benefits of cross-retaliation.  Importantly, 
however, the countries that are best able to overcome the barriers to using 
intellectual property rights-suspension to seek relief are not the least devel-
oped countries with the smallest economies. 
Part I of this Article discusses the structure and theory of remedies at 
the WTO.  Part II describes cases in which cross-sector retaliation has been 
approved by the Dispute Settlement Body and the subsequent history as it 
relates to compliance or financial settlement.  Part III analyzes these cases in 
light of the theory behind WTO remedies and the inclusion of intellectual 
property rights within the WTO Agreement.  The Article concludes by argu-
ing that cross-retaliation through intellectual property rights suspension nei-
ther solves the problems associated with WTO remedies, nor have its poten-
tial benefits been realized.  Instead, cross-retaliation suffers from many of the 
same problems as traditional WTO remedies.  Its potential costs to innovation 
are unlikely to be very high if it is rarely threatened or imposed.  And, its rare 
use is due in large part to the characteristics of intellectual property rights 
that make this remedy difficult to implement.  Ultimately, cross-retaliation 
through IP rights suspension is a remedy the threat of which may be useful 
to promote settlement of claims for some subset of developing countries, but 
it fails as a means to counteract the disadvantages faced by least developed 
countries seeking compliance or redress for continuing violations by more 
powerful countries. 
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I.  REMEDIES AT THE WTO: STRUCTURE AND THEORY 
In the twentieth century, countries have turned to international trade law 
to increase global welfare by lowering barriers to trade.25  According to mod-
ern trade theory, lower tariffs increase competition and lead countries to spe-
cialize in industries in which they have a comparative advantage over oth-
ers.26  The GATT significantly reduced barriers to trade by, inter alia, setting 
a harmonized tariff schedule and providing that countries extend any trade 
concession made to one country to all member countries.27  The GATT and 
subsequent rounds of negotiation have resulted in the reduction of thousands 
of tariffs and affected tens of billions of dollars of trade.28  One strength of 
the Agreement has been the near worldwide participation.  Countries are bet-
ter able to abandon protectionist measures when the changes are directly cou-
pled to increased availability of new markets and cheaper imports.  Never-
theless, countries still seek to encourage their domestic industries and 
implement non-tariff means of support that have, in turn, spurred new agree-
ments.29  Thus, momentum built to address measures constituting non-tariff 
barriers to trade. 
Further rounds of negotiations led to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement, 
which established the WTO Agreement.  The WTO Agreement expanded 
                                                          
 25.  Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade in Patented Goods: International Exhaustion for 
Patents, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 317, 328, 332–39 (2014) (comparing modern international trade 
law with mercantilist trade theories). 
 26.  KRUGMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY & POLICY 25–26 (2012).  This 
book provides an example in which the United States produces ten million roses for Valentine’s 
Day, although with the same resources it could have produced one hundred thousand computers.  
Id.  Columbia, in contrast, can produce ten million roses easily, whereas devoting those resources 
to making computers would only yield thirty thousand computers.  Id.  The difference in price ratios 
means that roses are relatively more expensive to produce in the United States in winter than in 
Columbia, and vice versa with respect to computers.  Id.  Low tariffs allow the United States to stop 
growing winter roses and Columbia to shift its resources out of computer manufacturing.  Both 
countries are better off than before.  Id.  This is the (very) basic example of the potential gains from 
trade based on comparative advantage, generally attributed to the economist David Ricardo.  See 
Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade Pol-
icy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 55 (1998). 
 27.  GATT, supra note 3 (quoting the purpose of the GATT as the “substantial reduction of 
tariffs and other trade barriers and to the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous basis”). 
 28.  See Douglas A. Irwin, International Trade Agreements, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/InternationalTradeAgreements.html (last visited 
July 12, 2016) (“The annual gain from removal of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade as a result of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement . . . has been put at about $96 billion, or 0.4 percent of world 
GDP.”). 
 29.  Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 59 (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2745632. 
RajecFinalBookProof11_3_16 11/3/2016  4:57 PM 
178 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:169 
significantly on the GATT.30  In addition to further lowering tariffs, the WTO 
Agreement included agreements on areas considered non-tariff barriers to 
trade, such as telecommunications, industrial and product safety standards, 
and intellectual property—all areas of governance that are typically thought 
to implement domestic policy preferences rather than solely protectionist 
purposes.31  TRIPS seeks to minimize variations in the protection of intellec-
tual property rights through minimum requirements for protection of intel-
lectual property rights.32  The argument in favor of harmonization of intellec-
tual property laws is that wildly different regimes of protection made it 
difficult for companies to operate across borders, whereas the certainty of 
intellectual property rights protection would encourage greater amounts of 
foreign direct investment and manufacturing of goods worldwide.  The 
TRIPS Agreement has provided a strong push towards a harmonized patent 
law, addressing substantive measures in addition to the procedural issues that 
were the primary focus of previous agreements.33  Though copyright law al-
ready enjoyed some substantive harmonization pre-TRIPS, it also gained 
stronger global protection through the Agreement.34  In addition, the TRIPS 
Agreement includes enforcement measures—common to all the WTO agree-
ments—that previous intellectual property law agreements did not.35  The ne-
gotiations surrounding the TRIPS Agreement were contentious and split 
along lines of development and wealth.  A common narrative shows that de-
veloping and least developed countries were strong-armed into accepting the 
requirements of TRIPS in order to gain access to markets crucial for their 
economic growth.36 
                                                          
 30.  Marrakesh Agreement supra note 1.   
 31.  See id. (stating desire of members to substantially reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade 
in order to raise standards of living and employment levels, expand the production of and trade in 
goods and services, and allow for optimal use of world resources). 
 32.  TRIPS, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 33.  See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2821, 2824 (1999) (describing the TRIPS Agreement as a “tectonic shift in the landscape of 
intellectual property law”); see also Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in Interna-
tional Patent Law, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 153, 167 (2013) (describing how TRIPS requirements address 
patent-eligible subject matter, standards of patentability, and the duration and scope of rights, inter 
alia). 
 34.  Rajec, supra note 33, at 154.  
 35.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 1.  
 36.  HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 39–40 (2007) (describing the United States’ strategy of withdrawing certain 
trade benefits and threatening trade sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act as retaliation for 
refusal to grant certain patent rights); Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Be-
tween Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
193, 194 (2002) (describing how “American-based multinational corporations” pushed for adoption 
of TRIPS). 
RajecFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  4:57 PM 
2016] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOSTAGE 179 
The WTO’s enforcement measures serve to strengthen the provisions in 
TRIPS, which may be seen as a win for proponents of strong intellectual 
property rights.37  However, they also allow aggrieved countries to threaten 
TRIPS suspension in response to violations of other agreements in certain 
circumstances. 
The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO (“DSB”) may authorize com-
pensatory or retaliatory trade measures against a country found in violation 
of one of its constituent agreements, following an opportunity for the violator 
country to amend its laws or practices.38  Retaliatory measures (or counter-
measures) generally consist of a suspension of concessions by the complain-
ing country towards the noncompliant country.39  As a result, retaliatory 
measures increase trade barriers for the noncompliant member.40 
A.  WTO Structure for Retaliation: Compensation, Countermeasures, 
and Cross-Retaliation 
The WTO Agreement includes a Dispute Settlement Understanding 
Agreement (“DSU”) that details how complaints are to be filed and disputes 
resolved.41  The WTO’s treatment of dispute resolution represents a change 
from the GATT’s negotiation model of dispute settlement to a more robust 
adjudicative system under the WTO.42  At the time, it was thought that a 
stronger adjudicatory system would prove to be fairer to weaker countries, 
whereas negotiations allowed “some countries to use their relative political 
                                                          
 37.  Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS Agreement 
Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 N. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 99, 104–05 (2004) (discuss-
ing the strong impact of TRIPS due to the linkage of intellectual property rights with trade and the 
enforcement measures available); Adrian Macey, Dispute Settlement in TRIPS: A Two-Edged 
Sword, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY 
ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 351, 351–54 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015) (describing 
how the United States wanted to institutionalize cross-retaliation as a means of ensuring intellectual 
property law enforcement through suspension of trade concessions against developing countries). 
 38.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 21(3). 
 39.  The WTO also provides for a rarely-used remedy of “compensation,” according to which 
the violator country eases trade barriers unrelated to the dispute.  Id. art. 22(4).  Because it is rare, 
this Article does not explore it. 
 40.  Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules—To-
ward A More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 337 (2000) (describing the imposition 
of countermeasures as “detrimental to free trade principles”); Sebastian, supra note 8, at 338 (“[T]he 
remedy for one violation of the treaty is an offsetting violation of the treaty.”). 
 41.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 1. 
 42.  Davey, supra note 15, at 60.  The GATT stressed negotiations between parties; there was 
no right to establishment of a panel, and a panel report could only be adopted by consensus of 
members (including the “losing” party).  Id. at 58, 60; GATT art. XXIII:2; see also Shaffer, Devel-
oping Country, supra note 10, at 168 (“With the WTO’s creation on January 1, 1995, international 
trade rules became more detailed, and their application more judicialized.” (footnote omitted) (cit-
ing Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 COMP. POL. STUD. 
147 (1999)). 
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and economic strength to take advantage of weaker countries.”43  As a result, 
conflict resolution at the WTO has been lauded as more “legal” and less “po-
litical” than dispute settlement under other treaties and international agree-
ments.44  In practice, however, the costs of bringing disputes and structural 
characteristics have led to critiques that dispute settlement at the WTO also 
suffers from power differentials.  It is this critique, discussed further below, 
that has many turning to cross-retaliation as a potential method to empower 
developing countries in WTO enforcement.45 
The DSU establishes the DSB to oversee trade disputes, and grants au-
thority to assign dispute settlement panels if the parties are unable to resolve 
the dispute through consultations.46  Panel decisions are subject to appeal, 
heard by the Appellate Body.47  Decisions by the DSB are automatically 
adopted, which contrasts with the GATT’s requirement of a consensus for 
adoption, allowing a losing party to block adoption of a panel report.48  When 
a violation is found, the DSU requires “prompt compliance,” monitored by 
the DSB.49  If a noncompliant country fails to bring its laws into compliance, 
the DSU dictates the process for the complainant to request permission to 
retaliate. 
Member countries often resolve their disputes without the involvement 
of a dispute settlement panel, and only in a minority of cases do member 
countries fail to comply with DSB rulings.50  Observers differ on how they 
characterize the outcomes of disputes, but according to the WTO, member 
                                                          
 43.  Davey, supra note 15, at 72.   
 44.  James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 248, 250 (2001); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade 
Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 803 (2001) (“The establishment of the Appellate Body made the 
system more judicial.”). 
 45.  See infra Parts I.B. & D.  
 46.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 6. 
 47.  The appellate process is detailed in DSU articles 16 & 17. 
 48.  See supra note 42. 
 49.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 21.1.  The DSU suggests that there is flexibility in determining a 
“reasonable period of time,” but as a guideline, suggests that it “should not exceed 15 months from 
the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report.”  Id. art. 21.3(c).  However, during this 
time the member country must file status reports to the DSB.  Id. art. 21.6. 
 50.  At the end of 2014, 488 disputes had been brought at the WTO.  Resolving Trade Disputes 
Between WTO Members, WTO, at 3, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/20y_e/dispute_bro-
chure20y_e.pdf [hereinafter Resolving Trade Disputes].  More than half of those disputes were re-
solved without the involvement of a dispute settlement panel.  Id. at 6.  Even those disputes that 
resulted in findings of violations generally were resolved through compliance and settlement; in 
2010, only seventeen disputes resulted in authorization to retaliate through suspension of conces-
sions.  Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn, Introduction: Trade Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settle-
ment: A Multi-disciplinary Analysis, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, 10 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010) (“Of the so far 
seventeen authorizations to retaliate, eight were granted to developing countries and only in one 
instance did a developing country actually implement the retaliation . . . .”). 
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countries party to a dispute comply with DSB rulings at a rate of ninety per-
cent.51  A study of decisions over the course of the WTO’s first ten years 
found that “[a]pparent more-or-less-full compliance” was achieved in 67.1% 
of the cases where a violation was found, but that only 8.9% of cases resulted 
in “[u]nabashed noncompliance.”52  Still, noncompliance happens.53 
In the event that recommendations or rulings are not implemented 
“within a reasonable period of time,”54 the DSU allows for compensation 
to—or suspension of concessions by—the complaining country.55  There is 
no provision for the award of financial compensation.56  Rather, compensa-
tion in the DSU describes the reduction of tariffs on specific goods by the 
violating country57 and is a rarely-used remedy.58  Retaliatory countermeas-
ures are the preferred remedy for countries complaining of ongoing trade vi-
olations.59  Retaliation refers to the imposition of countermeasures, deter-
mined through arbitration and subsequent approval by the DSB after which 
                                                          
 51.  Resolving Trade Disputes, supra note 50, at 7. 
 52.  Gary Horlick & Judith Coleman, A Comment on Compliance with WTO Decisions, in THE 
WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 773 (Merit E. Janow 
et al. eds., 2008).  The remaining cases were characterized as resulting in partial compliance (eight 
cases out of seventy-nine), debatable compliance (six cases out of seventy-nine), and sleazy settle-
ments (five cases out of seventy-nine). Id.  
 53.  See id.; see also Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 794. 
 54.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 21.3 (requiring the violating member to inform the DSB of its 
intentions regarding implementation of recommendations, and describing a reasonable period of 
time as one proposed by the member and approved by the DSB, a time period agreed upon by the 
parties to the dispute, or, if necessary, a time period determined through binding arbitration). In 
practice, arbitrators take into account the nature of the implementing action that is required when 
setting a reasonable time.  Arbitrator Decision, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 35, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/13 (Aug. 19, 2005) (“Leg-
islative action will, as a general rule, require more time than regulatory rule-making, which in turn 
will normally need more time than implementation that can be achieved by means of an adminis-
trative decision.”). 
 55.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 2. 
 56.  Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 152 (“[C]ash transfers typically are not available as 
countermeasures in WTO disputes.”).  In contrast, the recently-released draft of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership agreement provides for financial damages as at least a temporary remedy for violations. 
Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW ZEALAND TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, art. 28.20(7), 
(10) & (11), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/28.-
Dispute-Settlement-Chapter.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).  
 57.  For example, Japan reduced tariff rates on certain goods pending full implementation of 
the Appellate Body report in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages.  See generally Appellate Body 
Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Feb. 14, 1997).  
 58.  See Bryan Mercurio, Why Compensation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 315, 325 (2009) (discussing the rare use 
of compensation as a remedy for trade violations, likely because the noncompliant country is re-
sponsible for implementing the compensatory system, removing control from the complaining coun-
try that already has reason to mistrust the noncompliant country). 
 59.  Id. 
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the complaining country may impose approved countermeasures against the 
noncompliant member. Countermeasures take the form of suspensions of 
concessions made under the WTO and ancillary agreements.60 
The DSU provides guidelines about what type of concessions may be 
suspended, how to determine the appropriate value for countermeasures, and 
the duration of the measures.61  Countermeasures are tied in size to the harm 
suffered by a complaining country and constrained in time to counter pro-
spective harms and cease upon compliance.62  The DSB may authorize a com-
plaining country to suspend concessions or other obligations to the noncom-
pliant member under the WTO Agreement at a level that is “equivalent” to 
the nullification or impairment of benefits that was suffered with the initial 
violation.63  Despite the requirement of equivalence, the countermeasures are 
imposed prospectively, and do not redress losses from past violations.64  In 
addition, according to the DSU, countermeasures are meant to be temporary, 
applied only until measures are taken to bring the violator country into com-
pliance or until another satisfactory solution is found.65  Countermeasures are 
generally meant to be applied in the same trade sector as the violation, so that 
an unfair tariff on goods will be countered with higher tariff levels against 
other, imported goods from the noncompliant country.66  However, com-
plaining countries may seek to impose countermeasures on goods or under 
agreements not implicated by the initial violation. 
                                                          
 60.  DSU, supra note 6, arts. 2, 22.2.  
 61.  See generally id. art. 22. 
 62.  Id. art. 22.4. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  The time lag between a complaint and the potential imposition of sanctions has frequently 
been criticized for allowing a “free pass” for temporary violations. John H. Jackson, The Case of 
the World Trade Organization, 84 INT’L AFF. 437, 452 (2008) (describing the three year “free pass” 
countries have to violate the WTO because the dispute settlement process takes at least three years, 
and any damages are prospective in nature); Hyo-young Lee, “Remedying” the Remedy System for 
Prohibited Subsidies in the WTO: Reconsidering its Retrospective Aspect, ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L 
HEALTH L. POL’Y 423 (2015); Note, (In)efficient Breach of International Trade Law: The State of 
the “Free Pass” after China’s Rare Earths Export Embargo, 125 HARV. L. REV. 602 (2011) (dis-
cussing the time lag between a country’s breach and the imposition of remedies and potential un-
derdeterrence of breach as a result). 
 65.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.8 provides:  
The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be 
applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement 
has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings pro-
vides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory 
solution is reached. 
 66.  If the complaining party considers it “not practicable or effective” to retaliate within the 
same sector, it may ask to retaliate against another sector within the same agreement. Id. art. 
22.3(b).; The DSU defines “sector” to mean:  
(i) with respect to goods, all goods; 
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Cross-retaliation is the imposition of countermeasures under other 
agreements, and the DSB may approve such measures if it determines that 
retaliation under the same agreement is “not practicable or effective” and if 
“circumstances are serious enough.”67  The measure of these standards de-
pends on the level of trade affected by the violation, its importance to the 
complaining country, and the “broader economic elements . . . and conse-
quences” of suspending concessions.68  As discussed below, a complaining 
country with a small economy is likely to suffer when it imposes high tariffs, 
as the tariffs result in higher prices for its domestic consumers of targeted 
goods or higher prices for intermediate goods that domestic industries depend 
on.  In contrast, a noncompliant country with a large economy will not be so 
affected by such countermeasures imposed by a small trading partner.  As a 
result, “practicable” has been understood as a measure of whether there was 
sufficient trade in the given sector to impose a sufficient retaliatory counter-
measure.69  The term “effective” has been interpreted to mean that a prospec-
tive countermeasure is likely to induce compliance by the member targeted 
by the countermeasure.70 
Thus, a violation with respect to goods may be countered with the sus-
pension of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement or GATS.71  This has 
been seen as an increasingly attractive way to counter perceived deficiencies 
in typical retaliatory countermeasures.72 
                                                          
(ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the current “Services Sec-
toral Classification List” which identifies such sectors; (14) 
(iii) with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each of the categories of 
intellectual property rights covered in Section 1, or Section 2, or Section 3, or Section 4, 
or Section 5, or Section 6, or Section 7 of Part II, or the obligations under Part III, or Part 
IV of the Agreement on TRIPS.   
Id. art. 22.3(f).  
 67.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.3(c). 
 68.  Id. art. 22.3(d). 
 69.  See, e.g., Arbitrator Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, ¶ 5.460, WTO Doc. 8WT/DS267/ARB/1 (adopted Aug. 31, 
2009); Arbitrator Decision, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distri-
bution Of Bananas, ¶ 70, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter “Arbitra-
tion Decision, EC–Bananas III”] (“[T]he ordinary meaning of ‘practicable’ is ‘available or useful 
in practice; able to be used’ or ‘inclined or suited to action as opposed to speculation etc.’  In other 
words, an examination of the ‘practicability’ of an alternative suspension concerns the question 
whether such an alternative is available for application in practice as well as suited for being used 
in a particular case.”). 
 70.  See, e.g., Arbitration Decision, EC–Bananas III, ¶ 72 (“[T]he term ‘effective’ connotes 
‘powerful in effect,’ ‘making a strong impression’, ‘having an effect or result’ . . . [allowing] the 
party seeking suspension to ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and has the desired 
result, namely to induce compliance by the Member which fails to bring WTO-inconsistent 
measures into compliance with DSB rulings within a reasonable period of time.”). 
 71.  See infra Part I.A. 
 72.  See infra Part I.A. 
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B.  Countermeasure Critiques 
Scholars and advocates for developing countries criticize traditional 
WTO remedies as ineffective, unfair, and counter-productive, particularly for 
developing countries.73  The perception that WTO remedies are ineffective 
stems from the fact that, in disputes that proceed to the point of authorization 
or imposition of remedial measures, the remedies have often not resulted in 
compliance.74  Most disputes are settled along the way—and those that are 
not settled before a panel or appellate body opinion is issued still have a like-
lihood of settling once a violation is found.  Remedies, therefore, do not come 
into play in most cases.75  As Steve Charnovitz explained in 2001, there is 
disagreement about whether the failure of remedies to induce compliance in-
dicates a lack of sufficiently sharp teeth or that trade agreements are simply 
fruitless in some circumstances.76 
The argument that WTO remedies are ineffective because they lack 
sharp teeth is based on the idea that there is systematic underdeterrence of 
violations.  Not every violation results in a WTO complaint, for reasons of 
costs, both political and fiscal.  Remedies do not contemplate compensation 
for past violations, including violations after the complaint or even after an 
adverse ruling; and because the benefits to a violator country may accrue in 
advantages against multiple countries, remedies will only be applied with re-
spect to those countries that have filed a complaint.  If a lack of sharp teeth 
is the problem, then increased—or more carefully targeted—remedies may 
result in greater compliance. 
The other possibility is that “sharper” teeth are not enough to induce 
compliance, because the threat of remedies plays a smaller role in countries’ 
compliance with the WTO than is typically theorized—particularly when 
those theories analogize to domestic private law.  Instead, this narrative posits 
that diplomacy and the interests of mutual adherence to and global interests 
in validity of the treaty tend to induce compliance in most cases.77  And, those 
                                                          
 73.  Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Par-
ties, and Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REV. 287 (2005) (examining reasons develop-
ing country members of WTO are discouraged from active engagement in dispute settlement by the 
system’s rules and procedures). 
 74.  See Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 796 (“In the three instances where sanctions were im-
posed (1 Bananas, 2 Hormones), little or no compliance has ensued.  In the other two episodes 
where sanctions were authorized (1 Bananas, 1 Aircraft), the winning country did not exercise its 
rights.”). 
 75.  This is not so different from domestic law, where the importance of remedies are nonethe-
less understood to derive from their importance in settlement negotiations. 
 76.  The imagery in this characterization is Charnovitz’s, and perhaps reflects that a dispute 
over bananas drove many of these observations.  Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 796.  
 77.  Horlick & Coleman, supra note 52, at 771 (starting their article with the premise that 
“WTO Members normally comply with their WTO obligations”). 
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cases that reach the remedies stage represent instances where countries’ pref-
erences are strong enough that compliance is politically costly.  Thus, it may 
well be that in some instances, countries are unable or unwilling to comply 
no matter the threatened—or imposed—remedy and regardless of whether 
the reasons strike observers as objectively meritorious.  One example of this 
inability or unwillingness to comply regardless of costs is the hormones dis-
pute between the United States and the European Union (“EU”).78  The 
United States challenged European regulations banning sales of hormone-
raised beef despite a lack of compelling scientific research showing a link 
between hormones and cancer.79  On one hand, the European ban on imports 
of beef-administered hormones can be characterized as the European Union’s 
commitment to longstanding methods of food production and hesitancy to 
take on risks absent long-term studies showing safety.  On the other hand, the 
measures may equally and plausibly be characterized as protectionist 
measures on behalf of domestic and local food production that favor smaller 
farms over larger, foreign, and potentially more efficient means of producing 
food.80  In either case, the European Union was unwilling to amend its laws 
following a finding of violation.81 
If perfect compliance is impossible due to domestic pressure—regard-
less of whether the pressure results from deeply felt anxiety or protectionist 
impulses—stronger remedies will not result in compliance.  Instead, the po-
tential benefit of harsh remedies, such as cross-retaliation, is that they serve 
to identify such situations and their threat ensures compliance in those cases 
that do not implicate such deeply held commitments to particular noncompli-
ant measures.  It is worth noting that for developing countries defending 
against complaints by developed countries, political pressure outside the 
scope of the WTO makes refusal to comply impossible.  This pressure may 
be due to dependence on foreign aid from the complaining country, for ex-
ample.82  Therefore, it may be more accurate to say that in some cases, 
                                                          
 78.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
 79.  Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dis-
pute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 743, 753–54 (2004). 
 80.  Id. at 766–76 (discussing United States’ claims that the hormones ban reflected protection-
ist interests rather than health concerns, an argument ultimately rejected by the Appellate Body of 
the DSB). 
 81.  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 253, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 
1998) (finding violation); Arbitrator Decision, European Communities – Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) WTO Docs. WT/DS26/ARB & WT/DS48/ARB (July 12, 
1999) (finding the United States and Canada entitled to impose $125 million in sanctions against 
the European Union).  Similarly, U.S. laws against online gambling can be characterized as repre-
senting a moral judgment against gambling or as a result of capture by and protectionism on behalf 
of gambling organizations within the United States.  
 82.  Shaffer, Developing Country, supra note 10, at 178. 
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stronger remedies imposed against developed countries will not result in 
compliance. The informal pressure that is brought to bear on developing 
countries makes deeply felt anxiety an unattainable luxury; they cannot af-
ford not to comply. 
Traditional trade retaliation is also criticized as being particularly inef-
fective when used by developing countries against developed countries.83  
This is because, for example, tariffs on exports to a developing country gen-
erally have little effect on producers and exporters in the developed coun-
try—developing country markets are simply too small to impact an industry 
that exports worldwide to many larger markets.84  At the same time, tariff-
type countermeasures may have a strong, negative impact on consumers in 
developing countries, as goods that have been subjected to high tariffs will 
be sold at higher prices to offset the tariffs.85  These higher prices harm con-
sumers in the complaining country.86  If the targeted goods are not of the type 
directly sold to consumers, but instead are raw materials used in products 
manufactured by domestic industries, tariffs may also be harmful to those 
industries that depend on low-cost inputs.87 
Another critique of WTO remedies is that they are unfair because of the 
separation between those who receive the benefits of noncompliant laws and 
those who are harmed by retaliatory measures.88  As discussed above, retali-
atory tariffs often have unintended impacts on constituencies in the complain-
ing country that are entirely unrelated to the dispute, such as consumers.  In 
addition, noncompliant country exporters whose goods are targeted with re-
taliatory tariffs are also often unrelated to those who benefit from the initial 
measures.  Tariffs are often imposed against goods in a different manufactur-
ing sector than the one that benefitted from the initial violation, resulting in 
                                                          
 83.  Marco Bronckers & Freya Baetens, Reconsidering Financial Remedies in WTO Dispute 
Settlement, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 281, 282 (2013); Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 404. 
 84.  See Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 404 (“[T]here is no way of forcing developed 
countries into compliance with their WTO obligations because any threat of retaliatory actions by 
developing countries, say in the form of more trade restrictions, will not be effective.  The size of 
their own markets and the consequential limited effect of the punitive tariffs imposed on partner 
countries and their firms may make threatened retaliatory trade action an insufficient deterrent.”). 
 85.  See Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 282 (“[W]ith retaliation, members may easily 
shoot themselves in the foot by making imports from the offending member more expensive.”). 
 86.  Nevertheless, this may be a boon—albeit modest, due to the small market—to domestic 
producers who are able to raise prices and capture more of the domestic market in the face of more 
expensive imports. 
 87.  See, e.g., Arbitrator Decision, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 5.153, WTO 
Doc.  WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009) (accepting Brazil’s position “that it would not be practi-
cable or effective to seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in relation to imports of capi-
tal, intermediate and other essential inputs into Brazil’s economy”). 
 88.  See Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 289 (critiquing current WTO remedies). 
RajecFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  4:57 PM 
2016] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOSTAGE 187 
harm to “innocent bystander” industries.89  For example, when the United 
States sought and received approval to retaliate against the European Com-
munities for their discriminatory treatment of bananas, the retaliatory tariffs 
levied on “bath preparations, other than bath salts,” in addition to handbags, 
bed linens, and coffee/tea makers.90  These industries—which suffered under 
100% tariffs—were unrelated to any industries that may have gained from 
the initial violations in the agricultural sector.91 
Lastly, retaliatory countermeasures are criticized as counterproductive 
because they increase trade barriers.  The “solution” to one noncompliant 
trade barrier is to impose a second in an unrelated area, increasing distortions 
to free trade.  Increasing the availability and imposition of cross-retaliation 
and introducing financial damages have both been raised as potential means 
to address these critiques of traditional remedies as ineffective, unfair, and 
counter-productive.92  If the threat of cross-retaliation is more effective at 
forcing compliance, then use of that threat will not result in further trade dis-
tortion.  If, instead, intellectual property rights are in fact suspended, then one 
would expect trade disruption in innovative and creative industries, as dis-
cussed below.  Financial damages are attractive because they do not directly 
distort trade.  Payment does not come from an unrelated industry or impose 
costs on consumers (except in their role as taxpayers).  In addition, financial 
damages could counter the unfairness critique of trade remedies if the money 
is used to alleviate harms to the injured industry.  This Section has explained 
the critiques of traditional countermeasures from a compliance perspective, 
though the possibility that remedies may be incapable of preventing breach 
raises the other view of WTO remedies.  The next Section, therefore, engages 
the debate over the purpose of WTO remedies: whether they ought to be 
crafted to induce total compliance or to allow for occasional breach—and if 
so, under what circumstances. 
C.  Theories of Retaliation 
Debate over the ideal amount and form of WTO remedies turns on the 
extent to which the goal of trade remedies is compliance-inducing versus 
compensatory. That is, whether the threat of retaliation ought to deter breach 
entirely or whether retaliation ought to merely reflect the cost to complaining 
                                                          
 89.  In this sense, a noncompliant country’s decision to continue its violation is a decision to 
transfer gains from the retaliated-against industry to the industry that is the beneficiary of the vio-
lation. 
 90.  Scott D. Andersen & Justine Blanchet, The United States’ Experience and Practice in Sus-
pending WTO Obligations, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 235, 238 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See infra Parts I.C.2 & I.D.   
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countries, allowing potential violators to calculate the cost of breach and 
choose whether to violate trade obligations.  The remedies provided in the 
WTO admit either justification.  The principle critique of the WTO frame-
work—that the WTO favors developed countries with stronger economies—
does not necessarily favor either compliance-inducing or compensatory 
views of remedies.  On the one hand, developing and least developed coun-
tries are viewed as already compelled to comply, while developed countries 
are able to flout the WTO rules.  Compliance-inducement is therefore seen 
as a way of ensuring the developed countries are not getting away with some-
thing that developing and least developed countries cannot.  On the other 
hand, if occasional breach by developed countries is a foregone conclusion, 
a method that allows for compensation may be appealing—in fact, the direct 
award of financial damages would be of great benefit from this perspective.  
Both theories may point to the benefits of cross-retaliation, albeit for different 
reasons. 
1.  The Conflicting Purposes of Countermeasures: Compliance or 
Compensation? 
The increased interest in remedying WTO violations by suspending—
or threatening suspension of—the intellectual property rights protection re-
quired by the TRIPS Agreement comes from proponents of both a compli-
ance and compensatory view of WTO remedies.  This interest stems from the 
difficulty of crafting appropriate and effective remedies as well as from a lack 
of agreement on what “appropriate” or “effective” mean in this context.  This 
discourse fits into the broader, ongoing debate about the purposes of remedial 
measures at the WTO,93 both as a descriptive and prescriptive matter.94  Some 
scholars suggest that the main objective of the WTO Agreement is compli-
ance,95 and that this purpose is intended to dictate appropriate remedies.  Un-
                                                          
 93.  In one arbitration, the arbitrators lamented that “it is not completely clear what role is to 
be played by the suspension of obligations in the DSU and a large part of the conceptual debate that 
took place in these proceedings could have been avoided if a clear ‘object and purpose’ were iden-
tified.” Arbitrator Decision, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 
6.4, WTO Doc. WT/DS217/ARB/BRA (Aug. 31, 2004).  It may be particularly frustrating to arbi-
trators that conceptual debates are left unsettled because of the non-precedential status of determi-
nations, meaning that prior decisions do not decide the issue for them, and their determination will 
not govern the decisions of future arbitration proceedings. 
 94.  Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and Design of Trade Retaliation in Context: What Is the 
Goal of suspending WTO Obligations?, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION 
IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 34, 35 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010). 
 95.  See Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 149 (terming this the “compliance theory” of 
countermeasures). 
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der this theory, remedies associated with violations should be tailored to in-
duce maximum—or perfect—compliance.96  Others suggest that perfect com-
pliance is impossible, and that remedies should seek to reduce noncompli-
ance to situations analogous to “efficient breach” in contract law, pointing to 
the DSU’s requirement that retaliation be “equivalent” to the impairment suf-
fered by a complaining country in arguing for compensatory-type remedies.97  
These different viewpoints dictate different interpretations of appropriate re-
taliation for violations of the WTO Agreement.98  Whether termed an “effi-
cient breach”99 (a problematic term given that trade distortions are generally 
seen as inefficient from a global welfare perspective) or framed as a method 
of “pricing noncompliance,”100 the second view generally counsels for lesser 
remedies than the first. 
Those who suggest that compliance is the primary purpose of remedies 
point to the centrality of compliance to the functioning of the WTO Agree-
ment, in general, as well as its incorporation into the Dispute Settlement 
Agreement’s stated purpose, specifically.101  In one sense, the compliance-
inducement view of WTO remedies flows quite plainly from an understand-
ing of the purpose and role of the WTO Agreement.  The premise of the WTO 
is that world welfare will increase with lower barriers to trade, but that uni-
laterally eliminating protectionist laws in any one country is often politically 
unpalatable.  The WTO carries out the work of the GATT, under which mem-
bers tie these politically unpalatable changes to new trade opportunities re-
sulting from reciprocal obligations undertaken by other members. 
Collective compliance is central to the WTO Agreement’s continued le-
gitimacy.  It follows, according to this argument, that the dispute settlement 
process should be geared towards enforcing compliance through its rulings 
                                                          
 96.  See, e.g., Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 290–91 (arguing that compliance is the 
main purpose of remedies because it allows for “security and predictability” of the multilateral trad-
ing system, consistent with DSU Art. 3 (2)); Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 1 (“Given the imbalances 
in trade and economic power amongst WTO Members, the central issue is whether suspending 
TRIPS obligations can do a significantly better job than traditional retaliation in facilitating com-
pliance by powerful WTO Members.”); see also Davey, supra note 15, at 68 (suggesting that en-
forcement is the principal goal of the dispute settlement system in GATT). 
 97.  See Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 150–51 (noting that the “equivalence” standard 
for determining countermeasures is not consistent with a compliance-inducing purpose). 
 98.  See id. at 162 (“Economic analysis can say little about ‘optimal’ retaliation in the WTO 
system absent a theory of what retaliation is supposed to accomplish.”). 
 99.  Posner & Sykes, supra note 16, at 243. 
 100.  Brewster, supra note 16, at 265. 
 101.  See Jackson, supra note 15, at 60 (noting that WTO members are legally obligated to com-
ply with the findings of dispute proceedings and thus “specific performance” is required of mem-
bers); Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 291 (arguing that full compliance with WTO obliga-
tions allows for security and predictability of the multilateral trading system). 
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and remedies.  Under this view, it is the threat of retaliation that keeps coun-
tries from resorting to trade restrictions.102  As Kyle Bagwell has noted, to 
achieve compliance, the long-term costs of retaliation must outweigh the 
short-term gains from cheating.103  Bagwell nonetheless suggests that the dif-
ficulty of calculating damages makes it unappealing to use WTO remedies 
this way.104  In contrast, some, like Marco Bronckers and Freya Baetens, see 
the difficulty of calculating the effects of initial violations and potential re-
taliatory measures as a strength of the compliance inducement view.  They 
argue that one reason a compliance-inducing view of WTO remedies is pref-
erable is because it absolves arbitrators from having to make precise judg-
ments about the complex financial implications of remedies.105  Thus, the 
potential for disproportionately large retaliatory measures offers the ad-
vantage that it need not be precisely calculated—the whole point is to make 
the retaliation more painful than the initial violation was beneficial. 
For those who support a compliance-inducing view of remedies, strong 
retaliatory measures are also seen as a means of balancing or neutralizing the 
portions of the DSU that otherwise result in undercompensation for harms.  
The delays in instituting remedial measures and their solely prospective ap-
plication mean that they rarely meet—let alone exceed—the benefits drawn 
by the violating country or the injury suffered by the complaining country.106 
The text of the DSU offers some support for the primacy of compliance 
in the dispute settlement process.  First, the stated objective of the DSU is the 
removal of measures inconsistent with the covered agreements.107  In addi-
tion, the provisions declaring that countermeasures are meant to last only un-
til compliance is achieved, which supports the idea that the DSU ultimately 
                                                          
 102.  Or, to be more precise, threats of retaliation enforce compliance when reputational costs, 
reciprocity, and other considerations are not sufficient. 
 103.  Kyle Bagwell, Remedies in the World Trade Organization: An Economic Perspective, in 
THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 733, 741 (Merit 
E. Janow et al. eds., 2008). 
 104.  Bagwell does not advocate for compliance-inducing retaliatory measures, explaining that, 
while theoretically appealing, discerning an optimal level of retaliation is complex due to uncer-
tainty about the losses caused by initial violations, the benefits and costs of retaliatory measures for 
the member countries directly involved in the conflict, and the third-party effects of retaliation-
caused trade distortions.  Id. at 750–51. 
 105.  Bronckers & Baetens, supra note 83, at 307 (explaining that one need not be precise about 
damages in order to induce compliance). 
 106.  See, e.g., Benjamin H. Liebman & Kasaundra Tomlin, World Trade Organization Sanc-
tions, Implementation, and Retaliation, 48 EMPIRICAL ECON. 715, 715 (2014) (presenting a study 
showing that the WTO-violative “Byrd Amendment” increased share returns of U.S. companies 
benefited by the subsidies that were larger than share declines experienced by firms targeted with 
retaliatory tariffs and suggesting that this diminished pressure on U.S. policymakers to strike down 
the noncompliant measure). 
 107.  DSU, supra note 6, art 3.7; Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 804 (“The tenor of these provi-
sions is that a suspension operates to drive compliance.”); Mercurio, supra note 58, at 321. 
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envisions member countries modifying their laws in order to comply with 
rulings.108 
This stated purpose of the WTO Agreement and its dispute settlement 
process, however, is not evident in the provisions governing the calculation 
of remedies.  As Joost Pauwelyn explains, while the ultimate purpose of the 
WTO dispute settlement process is to induce compliance,109 the DSU provi-
sions for countermeasures do not appear geared towards that goal.110  Or, in 
the words of Gene Grossman and Alan Sykes, “If the goal of the system is to 
ensure compliance, therefore, its design, at least as interpreted in the deci-
sions to date, is hard to square with that objective.”111  The provisions that 
supporters of a compliance theory rely upon describe the general purpose of 
the DSU, but need not require that retaliatory countermeasures be calibrated 
so as to maximize compliance.  Instead, as Pauwelyn and others have noted, 
the level—and forward-looking nature—of countermeasures allowed by the 
DSU suggest that they are meant to serve a compensatory or trade-balancing 
purpose.112  In particular, the DSU requires that the level of countermeasures 
be “equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment” imposed by the 
violation and thus tied to the harm suffered by a complaining party.113  The 
delay before countermeasures are imposed and the proportionality require-
ment may result in undercompensation and underdeterrence, leaving the im-
pression that compliance—another form of deterrence—may not be the driv-
ing force behind the calculation of remedies. 
Compliance theory dictates a different measure of remedies than com-
pensatory theories of remedies—and therefore has been criticized because it 
is not consistent with the proper level of countermeasures dictated by the 
                                                          
 108.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.8; see also Charnovitz, supra note 44, at 804–08 (arguing that 
there was a transformation from the rebalancing function contemplated under GATT and the com-
pliance-inducement function of remedies under the WTO).  
 109.  Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules—To-
ward A More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 343 (2000) (citing various arbitration 
proceedings that state the WTO’s commitment to compliance). 
 110.  Id. at 343–44. 
 111.  Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 150–51. 
 112.  Countermeasures are forward-looking in that they do not take into account harm done be-
fore the WTO has judged a measure to be in violation. 
 113.  “The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations . . . shall be equivalent to 
the level of the nullification or impairment.”  DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.4.  Provisions in the Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”) concerning appropriate remedies for rec-
tifying illegal subsidies are similar: they are to be “commensurate with the degree and nature of the 
adverse effects determined to exist.”  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 
7.9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 14, 21 [hereinafter SCM].  Calculation of the “level of the nullification or impair-
ment” is unsurprisingly often disputed in litigation and a topic of discussion in academic literature.  
See, e.g., Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 137–41 (discussing the parties’ arguments in Upland 
Cotton about whether countermeasures should be based on the lost trade volume for the harmed 
country or the value of the subsidy granted by the noncompliant country). 
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DSU.  If compliance is the goal of retaliatory measures, the appropriate level 
of countermeasures should be tied to the gains of the noncompliant country 
to negate incentives for noncompliance.  The countermeasures could even be 
punitive in nature, because larger potential remedies ought to induce greater 
compliance.114  Cross-retaliation is attractive from a compliance view be-
cause intellectual property-reliant industries are seen as having strong lobbies 
that are able to put pressure on a noncompliant government.  The harms to 
such industries from suspending intellectual property rights also may be large 
and diffuse, making the pressure on government not just acute, but also 
strong.115 
In contrast to the compliance theory, those who argue that the purpose 
of WTO remedies is compensation point to the allowed level of countermeas-
ures that is based on the damage done to the complaining country and on 
rebalancing trade.116  A number of scholars have embraced the idea of coun-
termeasures serving a compensatory purpose.  Alan Sykes argues that a view 
of WTO remedies as compensatory is consistent with the text of the DSU.117  
Moreover, Sykes argues that it is economically desirable to allow countries 
to breach the agreement in certain circumstances, and that these circum-
stances—analogous to an “efficient breach” in contract law—are best identi-
fied by a remedies regime that imposes compensatory damages.118  Together 
with Eric Posner, Sykes explains that international law has historically been 
self-enforcing, with breaches subject to unilateral retaliation and no legal 
oversight.119  It is only relatively recently that agreements, such as the WTO, 
provide for remedial systems with judicial oversight.120  The WTO remedies, 
Sykes and Posner argue, reflect the economic logic of the “efficient breach” 
in contract law by recognizing both that the underlying laws embodied in the 
WTO may, at times, be inefficient,121 and that sometimes breach is inevitable 
and the remedial system should recognize this reality.122  The argument that 
                                                          
 114.  Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 150. 
 115.  Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 2 (“A withdrawal of obligations under TRIPS can generally 
be expected to have a significant impact on key industries and thereby provide a strong incentive to 
industrialized countries to comply with WTO rulings.”). 
 116.  Pauwelyn, supra note 94, at 38.  
 117.  Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations Under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 347, 353 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard 
Quick eds., 2000); Posner & Sykes, supra note 16, at 243; Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 
149. 
 118.  Sykes, supra note 117, at 351.  
 119.  Posner & Sykes, supra note 16, at 245. 
 120.  Id. at 257. 
 121.  Id. at 245.  In other words, laws embodied in the WTO may fail to promote national or 
global welfare. 
 122.  Id. at 246. 
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occasional breach is inevitable for political reasons does not mean that breach 
is “efficient” from a global economic perspective, but compensatory-type 
remedies will ensure that it only occurs when a country’s idiosyncratic values 
are held sufficiently strongly, an occurrence perhaps better-termed “unavoid-
able” or “expedient” breach.  Setting rules for breach allows countries some 
certainty about what the costs of various choices will be and allow for “le-
galized noncompliance.”123 
Offering another take on compensatory damages, Rachel Brewster ex-
plains that “pricing compliance,” or using dispute resolution to set the cost of 
breach, may be an attractive feature of the WTO Agreement’s strong dispute 
resolution procedures.124  In other words, “governments may create formal 
dispute resolution systems to lower the costs of deviation rather than to raise 
them.”125  This argument contrasts with the compliance theory viewpoint that 
full compliance strengthens the WTO Agreement.  Instead, Brewster sug-
gests that countries are only willing to submit to the strong provisions of the 
WTO Agreement because of the option of breach.  According to this view, 
the success of the WTO is based on its option to opt out. 
Efficient breach in any context has its critics.126  In the WTO context, 
additional criticism of the compensatory view of remedies is that it may be 
                                                          
 123.  Posner & Sykes, supra note 16, at 253.  
 124.  See Brewster, supra note 16, at 265 (“[The] choice of a dispute resolution system is often 
a purposeful effort to limit remedies to the harm caused, and thus to price noncompliance rather 
than to sanction it.”).  
 125.  Id. at 302.  Brewster, together with Adam Chilton, has also delved deeper into dispute 
resolution procedures to show that one of the greatest predictors of compliance with DSB rulings in 
the United States is whether the compliance must be achieved through congressional action—in 
which case it is less likely to occur.  See Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: 
Why and When the United States Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 201, 203 (2014) 
(“[W]ho within the government supplies compliance is the best predictor of whether and when the 
U.S. government complies with WTO rulings.  The need for congressional involvement in the com-
pliance process both decreases the likelihood of compliance and delays compliance more than any 
other factor.”). 
 126.  In the context of contract law, using expectation damages as a means of encouraging effi-
cient breach may suffer from a problem of overreliance—where the harmed party knows there is a 
chance the other party will breach, but because compensation is certain, will proceed in reliance on 
the other parties’ performance.  Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL 
J. ECON. 466, 472 (1980).  In the international context, this argument would suggest that countries 
who foresee long-term breach from others should adjust industrial policy accordingly, rather than 
relying on compensatory measures or the potential for financial settlements.  A. Mitchell Polinsky 
explains that efficient breach theory makes sense to push the breaching party to behave efficiently, 
but when we have reason to be concerned about the harmed party’s incentives, other remedies such 
as restitution will spur more efficient behavior.  A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 38 (2d ed. 1989).  In the international context, Polinsky’s explanation sug-
gests that expectation damages are likely a reasonable remedial choice because overreliance is less 
of a concern.  The reason for this is that—unlike in the contract setting—the party that is harmed 
(domestic industry) is not the same party that decides to bring suit (the government) nor, im-
portantly, is it the same party that is benefited by retaliatory measures.  See supra note 88 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the fairness critique of WTO remedies. 
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available to wealthy, developed countries as a way to buy themselves out of 
their obligations while conferring favors on their strongest industries in the 
form of WTO-violating policies.  This is because potential retaliatory 
measures fall on other industries,127 have lesser impact when imposed by de-
veloping countries with small markets,128 and may even take the form of set-
tlement payments, in which case the cost is dispersed over taxpayers while 
the benefits are concentrated on industries with the strongest lobbies.  In this 
way, developed countries might be under—encouraged to comply.  Thus, 
even assuming that some cases may present situations where countries are 
unwilling or unable to comply, a compensatory theory of countermeasures is 
likely to result in breach more frequently than is desirable.  Even those who 
argue for compensatory remedies agree that instances of breach ought to be 
minimized.  The likelihood that developed countries might buy their way out 
of their obligations is exacerbated by the delays that are allowed for in insti-
tuting countermeasures and the prospective nature of countermeasures.  Be-
cause much of the damage to the complaining country remains uncompen-
sated, there may be undercompensation, resulting in higher levels of breach 
than a true compensatory regime would predict. 
This critique of a compensatory theory of WTO remedies is supported 
by the fact that developing countries generally have complied with WTO rul-
ings, while the instances of noncompliance are generally attributable to de-
veloped countries.  At the same time, what it misses, when discussing the 
ways that current WTO damages do not mimic expectation damages in con-
tract law—that is, they do not fully compensate for harms—is that these 
breaches are still fairly infrequent.  One explanation is that there are other 
costs to developed countries of exercising the option to breach.  These are the 
reputational costs that have traditionally been seen as the force behind com-
pliance, particularly for treaties with less in the way of formalized dispute 
resolution.129  From a compensatory damages perspective, cross-retaliation is 
appealing because it solves some of the problems associated with the inef-
fectiveness of developing country complaints due to the size of the market 
and it may benefit consumers through the potential for lower prices on inno-
vative goods, at least in the short term. 
                                                          
 127.  See supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text.  
 128.  See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.  
 129.  See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1861–65 (2002) (discussing factors that affect the importance of reputational 
costs in state decisions to breach international obligations); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, 
Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2002) (discussing the com-
plex factors that affect reputational costs of breach in international law). 
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2.  The Appeal of Financial Damages 
Financial damages have some appeal to scholars from both camps, and 
the cross-retaliation cases that occupy the next Section may be cast as one 
way of attaining many of the benefits of financial damages through settle-
ment.  Scholars from both camps—those who support the compliance theory 
of remedies and those who argue for compensatory remedies—have sug-
gested that financial damages may solve some of the structural problems as-
sociated with retaliatory countermeasures.  One benefit is that financial com-
pensation does not result in greater trade distortion in the way that traditional 
countermeasures do.130  A separate but related benefit is that financial reme-
dies solve the problem of suspending concessions to industries that did not 
benefit from the initial violation and are merely located in the noncompliant 
country.131  In addition, the option of financial remedies might benefit weaker 
WTO members who have difficulty imposing effective countermeasures be-
cause those measures generally inflict greater harm on the imposing country 
than the noncompliant country.132  Financial damages, in contrast, provide a 
concrete benefit to a harmed country. 
Financial damages have some of the same potential problems as retali-
ation.  For example, the counterargument to the optimistic prediction that fi-
nancial damages might give weaker WTO members greater recourse to rem-
edies is that the relative ease of paying financial damages—as opposed to the 
harm and subsequent lobbying that occur when an “innocent” industry is tar-
geted by remedies—will result in a greater number of breaches.133  If 
breaches become too common, the norm of compliance will be softened, 
threatening the strength and value of the multilateral agreement.  Addition-
ally, the potential for monetary compensation could make WTO litigation 
                                                          
 130.  See Mercurio, supra note 58, at 329 (“[T]he most attractive feature of financial compensa-
tion is that, like trade compensation, it is not trade restrictive, and thus does not conflict with WTO 
principles.”). 
 131.  See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules—
Toward A More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 345–46 (2000) (“Pecuniary compen-
sation would . . . make more economic sense than both the suspension of concessions and a com-
pensatory lifting of trade barriers in mostly unrelated sectors . . . .”). 
 132.  See id. (“[Financial damages] would . . . be easier to monitor and more accessible for 
weaker WTO members.”); William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 
42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 119, 126 (2009) (“[O]nly a small group of powerful countries can be ex-
pected to effectively use retaliation.  The obvious possible remedy is to allow a prevailing party to 
choose between suspension of concessions and receipt of a periodic monetary payment.”). 
 133.  See Davey, supra note 132, at 126 (“The system would have to be designed to avoid the 
possibility that rich members could effectively buy their way out of obligations in a way not avail-
able to the poor members.  That result might be accomplished by tying the amount of fines to the 
size of the member’s economy or otherwise providing for a sliding scale that would minimize “dis-
crimination” against poor members.”). 
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more appealing by driving conflicts that are now resolved politically into le-
gal proceedings and encouraging rent-seeking behavior over diplomacy. 
Despite the appeal of financial damages as a solution to the difficulties 
associated with crafting a remedial scheme at the WTO, it has not gained 
traction in international negotiations.  This may be because those negotiations 
have effectively stalled overall.134  Only recently have financial remedies 
made their way into some of the multi-lateral trade agreements that are under 
negotiation—primarily those in which the United States is a party.135  The 
negotiated draft of the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership provides for the 
payment of monetary compensation until the parties have settled or the vio-
lator country has brought its laws into compliance.136  It remains to be seen 
if these types of provisions will become common in regional treaties and gain 
adherence internationally. 
D.  Intellectual Property in Trade Agreements and the Making of IP 
Hostages 
Cross-retaliation for WTO violations through suspension of intellectual 
property rights has the potential to bridge the compliance-compensation de-
bate on remedies and to provide a path to financial damages.  Of course, this 
was not the intention of including intellectual property law standards in the 
WTO Agreement.  Instead, attempts to harmonize intellectual property laws 
through the TRIPS Agreement are meant to encourage businesses to produce 
and sell goods globally, increase investment in developing economies and 
open new markets for innovative corporations.137  Absent these protections, 
companies would be hesitant to expand into foreign markets because of the 
                                                          
 134.  Takemasa Sekine, Financial Compensation in Trade Dispute Settlements: Can the Free 
Trade Agreement Experiment be Successful?, 10 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 465, 
467 (2015) (pointing out that financial compensation has not yet materialized as a remedy under the 
WTO); World Trade Talks End in Collapse, BBC NEWS, (July 29, 2008, 10:46 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/7531099.stm.  
 135.  Sekine, supra note 134, at 465–66. 
 136.  Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW ZEALAND TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, art. 
28.20.7, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/28.-Dis-
pute-Settlement-Chapter.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).  In this draft, there is a cap on monetary 
compensation set at fifty percent of the level of benefits the panel has determined may be suspended 
in retaliation, and a requirement that the suspension not last more than a year unless the complaining 
country agrees to an extension.  Id. art. 28.20.7, 10. 
 137.  Rajec, supra note 33, 153 (discussing benefits and drawbacks of increased uniformity in 
global patent law).  The premise that uniform IP laws are beneficial to developing countries is con-
tested, and some of the scholars who support cross-retaliation support it in part because it allows a 
path for lower levels of IP enforcement.  This Article argues that cross-retaliation is an ill-suited 
instrument to decrease TRIPS requirements for developing countries.  However, the very potential 
that IP rights—supposedly more protected than previously because of the WTO Agreement—might 
be threatened by their association with it serves as an example of how countries’ IP and trade inter-
ests do not always fit seamlessly together, although they are aligned in theory. 
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threat of copying.  Minimum required levels of intellectual property laws in 
countries party to TRIPS lower the transaction costs associated with operat-
ing in different legal environments and provide a baseline for IP rights pro-
tection.  However, with the possibility of cross-retaliation under the TRIPS 
Agreement, the strength of those rights is challenged.  Nevertheless, the use 
of cross-retaliation has some appeal from a trade perspective. 
Patent protection is a time-limited right to exclude that governments 
grant to inventors who disclose their inventions.138  This patent grants pro-
tection in exchange for disclosure of inventions with the assumption that pa-
tent holders may profit from producing or licensing the invention, a way of 
rewarding those who engage in commercially desirable innovation while 
benefiting the public through access to the technology—likely at a premium 
price before the patent expires—and as a part of the public domain following 
its expiration.139  Those arguing for changes in the strength of patent protec-
tion or remedies associated with infringement often reference the tradeoff 
between protection and access.140  These tradeoffs and balances, discussed 
below, are not the ones that drive discussions of the potential role of cross-
retaliation through suspension of intellectual property rights.  Instead, the po-
tential role for cross-retaliation has been measured by the ways it may be able 
to address structural problems in WTO remedies, generally. 
                                                          
 138.  In the United States, the right of Congress to grant patents “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts” is enshrined in the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 139.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Ex-
perimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989), reprinted in MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 33–34 (1998) (reasoning that courts expect the right of exclusion 
to provide incentives for individuals to invest in research and disclose their inventions, thereby ben-
efiting the public); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case 
for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 195–97 (2009) (describing how 
the patent system solves the public goods problem by granting inventors time limited, exclusive 
rights to control their invention); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (determining that the exclusive rights granted to inventors is a lim-
itation society accepts in the name of increased innovation); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect 
Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2004) (arguing that the protections offered to 
inventors create rewards for continued innovation by eliminating the fear that a product may be 
appropriated by a competitor). 
 140.  See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT (2009); Burk & Lemley, supra note 139; Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit 
All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Anna 
B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
43 (2012) (suggesting patentable subject matter doctrine as potential policy lever for calibrating 
patent scope); Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
207 (2011) (suggesting two new patent forms to mitigate the social costs of traditional patents and 
increase access by subsequent inventors); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur 
Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 742–48 (2012) (suggesting that courts weigh the public interest 
in encouraging innovation and promoting access when determining the appropriateness of the rem-
edy of a permanent injunction). 
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The threat of cross-retaliation through TRIPS suspension has been wel-
comed by many as a way of evening the playing field between developed and 
developing countries to increase compliance.141  It is also a potential way to 
effect a transfer—a method of allowing for financial damages that are not 
provided for in the WTO.142  Because the industries in developed countries 
generally value intellectual property rights highly,143 remedies that target 
these industries theoretically will result in the strongest lobbying for bringing 
laws into compliance.144  Moreover, some that support greater use of cross-
retaliation under TRIPS suggest that where noncompliance continues, sus-
pension of IP rights may have some benefits.145  For example, domestic in-
dustries in the complaining country will be able to enter the market for a drug 
earlier than expected if patent rights go unenforced.  As a result, domestic 
consumers will gain access to medication for a lower cost.  As Arvind Subra-
manian and Jayashree Watal explain, cross-retaliation under TRIPS has the 
dual benefits that it “inflict[s] loss or pain swiftly on the party being retaliated 
against” and is “beneficial to the country taking the action.”146 
The competing narratives of remedial purpose may appear reconcilable 
on the issue of cross-retaliation, particularly in relation to the TRIPS Agree-
ment.  Retaliation against a violation, such as granting illegal subsidies under 
the GATT, through intellectual property rights suspension exacts a high price 
                                                          
 141.  See supra note 96.  
 142.  See Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 161.  Grossman and Sykes note that the threat of 
cross-retaliation might: 
[Result in a] transfer of rents from interest groups in the violator country to the complain-
ing nation.  If so, it may have the nice property that it is much closer to a ‘transfer’ than 
traditional trade sanctions, which may make it relatively attractive.  Indeed, if TRIPS 
retaliation could be orchestrated in such a way as to avoid damaging innovation incen-
tives (or other valuable interests served by intellectual property rights) . . . then it might 
dominate trade sanctions quite broadly. 
Id. 
 143.  The importance of intellectual property protection to developed countries was central to 
the creation of the TRIPS Agreement and its inclusion in the WTO.  Antony Taubman, Thematic 
Review: Negotiating “Trade-Related Aspects” of Intellectual Property Rights, in THE MAKING OF 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL  INSIGHTS  FROM  THE  URUGUAY ROUND  NEGOTIATIONS 15, 
19 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015); see also Macey, supra note 37, at 351 (de-
scribing the developing countries as “clearly not the demandeurs in [the TRIPS] negotiation); Brew-
ster, supra note 11, at 49 (“[Intellectual property-dependent industries] are politically mobilized 
groups with the lobbying power to significantly influence national trade policies.”). 
 144.  Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 2 (“Affected industries are likely to lobby their respective 
(non-complying) governments to do everything necessary to avoid such suspensions in the first 
place . . . .”); Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 403. 
 145.  Ruse-Khan, supra note 11, at 3 (“[S]uspending IP protection may have positive welfare 
effects for a (developing) economy, especially in education and health.” (emphasis omitted)); Subra-
manian & Watal, supra note 11, at 407 (suggesting that reducing intellectual property protection 
will make countries better off).  
 146.  Subramanian & Watal, supra note 11, at 405–06. 
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for violations with little downside for the complaining country.147  As a result, 
cross-retaliation is attractive to compliance proponents.  For example, India, 
together with other developing countries,148 has proposed that it be allowed 
to cross-retaliate without a showing that other remedies are not practicable 
and effective.149 
At the same time, cross-retaliation proves attractive to many proponents 
of a compensatory justice theory of remedies—when properly calculated.150  
Cross-retaliation is seen as potentially solving some of the problems associ-
ated with remedies that are unrelated to allowing occasional breach.  For ex-
ample, the inability of weaker countries to retaliate is problematic under ei-
ther theory of remedies. Cross-retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement has 
the potential to solve this problem, and thus may also solve the problem of 
over-encouraging breach.151  In addition, it may lead to financial settle-
ments—thus using a property rule of damages to force the noncompliant 
country to reveal how much it values the violation.152  This characteristic fits 
in well with a compensatory justice theory of remedies, though not with a 
view focused on increased compliance. 
Many voices have therefore supported the idea of increased use and 
availability of cross-retaliation under TRIPS.  However, it has not proved to 
be a panacea in practice—albeit with a small sample size. In all three cases 
where cross-retaliation through IP rights suspension has been authorized, it 
                                                          
 147.  Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 161  (“In past arbitrations, the goal of complaining 
nations seeking cross-retaliation rights, of course, has been an authorization to retaliate under 
TRIPS.”). 
 148.  The proposal was made on behalf of Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.  Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Spe-
cial and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries Proposals on DSU, WTO Doc. 
TN/DS/W/19 (Oct. 9, 2002).  
 149.  See id. at 2.  The proposal suggested that a new paragraph 3bis be added to Article 22 of 
the DSU providing: 
  Notwithstanding the principles and procedures contained in paragraph 3, in a dispute 
in which the complaining party is a developing-country  Member and the other party, 
which has failed to bring its measures into consistence with the Covered Agreements is 
a developed-country Member, the complainant shall have the right to seek authorization 
for suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to any or all sectors under 
any covered agreements. 
Id.  
 150.  For a discussion of calculation, see Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 158.  
 151.  Not all commentators see such potential in cross-retaliation—some find it barbarously un-
fair and likely to greatly harm the noncompliant country beyond the harm it imposed.  One suggested 
that “this hyper-creative form of retaliation . . . seems excessive,” violating “the biblical injunction 
[of] . . . an eye for an eye,” and that seeking ever “more cruel and unusual forms of sanctions can 
only lead to barbarism.”  Alan Wm. Wolff, Remedy in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE WTO: 
GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 783, 798 (Merit E. Janow et 
al. eds., 2008). 
 152.  See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 94, at 34–73 (discussing property and liability rules in 
the context of trade retaliation). 
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has not been used.  In one case, compliance is set to be achieved twenty years 
after the dispute began—far longer than the three year free pass discussed in 
traditional WTO disputes above.  In a second case, the size and power dis-
parities between the two countries, together with the practical difficulties of 
taking advantage of rights suspension, have resulted in a stalemate.  In the 
last case, the authorization of cross-retaliation led to a financial settlement.  
However, the financial settlement was reached with a country that has a 
strong trading economy and a robust domestic industry ready to take up pro-
duction of the patented goods at issue, countering the idea that cross-retalia-
tion alone can address problems associated with economic and political dis-
parity.  These cases do not show a complete failure of cross-retaliation; 
however, they raise serious questions about its supposed superiority over 
other retaliatory measures. 
II.  CROSS-RETALIATION IN PRACTICE: IP HOSTAGES AND FINANCIAL 
SETTLEMENTS 
The competing purposes of WTO retaliation have informed the three 
cases in which cross-retaliation has been sought—and approved—at the 
WTO.  Arbitrators have found convincing arguments based on the relative 
sizes of the economies, bolstering arguments about the potential ill effects on 
the complaining country from imposing restrictions on imports from the non-
compliant country.  Moreover, these potential imbalanced effects suggested 
that other measures would not be effective in inducing compliance.  How-
ever, like other retaliatory measures, cross-retaliation has proven less effec-
tive as a threat by small countries against larger countries.  In one of the three 
cases, EC–Bananas III, Ecuador entered into an agreement with the EU 
whereby the EU eliminated its discriminatory quotas and pledged to reduce 
discriminatory tariffs.  The final tariff rates, however, will not be achieved 
until a full twenty years after the challenge was brought in the WTO.153  In-
tellectual property rights were not suspended. 
Two more recent cases have neither resulted in compliance, nor in sus-
pension of intellectual property rights.  In a challenge brought against the 
United States by Antigua, the countries have reached a stalemate, under 
which the United States has refused to bring its laws into compliance with 
GATS and Antigua continues to threaten to suspend intellectual property 
rights—but has not done so thus far.  It may be that the threat of cross-retal-
iation is more effective only when credible.  Thus, when Brazil threatened to 
suspend pharmaceutical patents held by U.S. entities in the second case, the 
threat did prompt action by the United States.  Even so, this more credible 
threat did not result in compliance. Instead, it precipitated a private, financial 
                                                          
 153.  See infra Part II.A.  
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settlement.  This Section describes the cases in which a WTO Arbitrator ap-
proved suspension of concessions under TRIPS.  In none of these cases, how-
ever, have intellectual property rights been suspended.  Thus, the emerging 
picture of cross-retaliation is that it is not a good tool to induce compliance; 
instead, it may spur negotiation of financial damages—but only for countries 
that otherwise have leverage. 
A.  European Community–Bananas III 
The first case in which cross-retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement 
was sought and approved resulted neither in full compliance nor in IP rights 
suspension.  As the name implies, EC–Bananas III,154 is one in a series of 
cases.  The banana disputes have been a decades-long battle over preferential 
market access granted by European states to the African, Caribbean and Pa-
cific (“ACP”) group of countries while restricting imports from banana-pro-
ducing Latin American countries.155  In 1996, Ecuador, together with Guate-
mala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States, challenged the EU’s 
agreement, called the Common Market Organization for Bananas 
(“CMOB”), as noncompliant with WTO agreements, including GATT and 
GATS.156  In 1997, a dispute resolution panel found the EU in violation of 
the WTO Agreement,157 a decision subsequently upheld by the Appellate 
Body.158  When the EU failed to bring its import regime into compliance by 
January 1999, Ecuador sought and received approval to impose retaliatory 
                                                          
 154.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Appel-
late Body Report, EC–Bananas III]. 
 155.  Bananas I resulted in a panel opinion holding that various European regimes violated 
GATT’s most favored nation requirement that “any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity” 
granted to goods from one contracting parties be afforded to goods from all contracting parties.  
GATT art. 1.1. Panel Report, European Economic Community – Member States’ Import Regimes 
for Bananas, DS32/R, ¶ 364-72, 375 (June 3, 1993) (not adopted) [hereinafter EC–Bananas I]. Sub-
sequently, the European Union countries entered into the “Common Market Organisation for Bana-
nas,” harmonizing the (preferential) treatment of bananas from certain countries and territories.  
Panel Report, European Economic Community – Import Regime for Bananas, ¶ 1 (Jan. 18, 1994), 
34 I.L.M. 180, 181 (1995) (not adopted).  This agreement was also found to violate GATT in Ba-
nanas II.  Id. at ¶ 170.  However, the GATT’s dispute settlement process required member consensus 
in order to adopt a panel opinion, and thus Bananas II was blocked from adoption by the EU.  Chi 
Carmody, Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties Under GATT, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 615, 645 (1997). 
 156.  The United States was not a producer of bananas, but challenged CMOB as noncompliant 
with GATS.  
 157.  Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution 
of Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/ECU (adopted Sept. 25, 1997). 
 158.  Appellate Body Report, EC–Bananas III, supra note 154. 
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countermeasures on goods from the EU.159  Ecuador sought to suspend obli-
gations and concessions it had made under the TRIPS Agreement in addition 
to GATS and GATT 1994—up to an amount of $450 million.160 
Ecuador’s request for authorization of cross-retaliation was based on its 
argument that it was not practicable or effective for it to implement its entire 
retaliation within the agreements that the EU had violated.  The Arbitrator 
found compelling Ecuador’s argument that because its imports from the EU 
were often used as “inputs in the domestic manufacturing process,” imposing 
retaliatory tariffs would harm Ecuador’s manufacturers—in addition to its 
consumers—more than it would harm European exporters.161  The Arbitrator 
also looked to the relative sizes of the markets, noting that “Ecuador, as a 
small developing country, only accounts for a negligible proportion of the 
[European Communities’] exports of these products” and, therefore, “the sus-
pension of concessions by Ecuador vis-à-vis the European Communities is 
unlikely to have any significant effect on demand for these [European Com-
munities’] exports.”162  As a result, the arbitrators recommended and the 
panel approved retaliation up to an amount of $201.6 million annually 
through suspension of concessions under GATT 1994, GATS, and TRIPS.163  
Ecuador proposed suspending the Ecuadorian intellectual property rights of 
European entities in sound recordings, industrial designs, and geographical 
indications.164 
Despite authorization, Ecuador did not implement the proposed retalia-
tory measures.  Instead, the countries ultimately reached a settlement, albeit 
following further challenges.  In April 2001, the EU and Ecuador agreed that 
Ecuador would suspend sanctions if the EU transitioned, by 2006, to a tariff-
only system instead of its previous combined tariff and quota system.165  
However, after a few years, Ecuador found that the measures the EU took 
were insufficient and, in 2008, the Appellate Body upheld a panel finding 
that the EU’s treatment of bananas based on their source country continued 
to violate GATT, once again requesting the EU to bring its provisions into 
                                                          
 159.  Arbitration Decision, EC–Bananas III, supra note 69, ¶¶ 171–77. 
 160.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 161.  Id. ¶¶ 89–96. 
 162.  Id. ¶¶ 95–96. 
 163.  Id. ¶¶ 170–73.  
 164.  Id. ¶¶ 161–63. 
 165.  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision, European Communities – Transitional 
Regime For the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of Bananas, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/16 (Nov. 21, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min-
decl_ec_bananas_e.htm; Press Release, Lamy Hails Accord Ending Long Running Banana Dispute, 
WTO Doc. PRESS/591 (Dec. 15, 2009), https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/news_e/pres09_e/pr591_e.htm. 
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compliance.166  In 2012, the EU and ten Latin American countries reached a 
new settlement and signed an agreement containing reductions in tariffs over 
time (and no quotas) for banana importation by the EU.167 
This was the first time TRIPS suspension was threatened, and the moral 
of its approval is not entirely clear.  While the agreement ultimately achieved 
compliance, it is likely that the EU’s desire to demonstrate a commitment to 
its international legal commitments and pressure from the United States 
played at least as large a role in its decision to comply as the threat of intel-
lectual property rights suspension.  Because the United States lined up with 
the Latin American countries, any retaliatory countermeasures approved 
were likely to present real threats, regardless of whether they were tariff- or 
TRIPS-related.  Perhaps the situation fit into the unavoidable breach cate-
gory, as the EU was able to negotiate to maintain preferences, albeit for a 
limited number of years.  An assessment of the economic impact of the EU’s 
measures, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.  Nor does this case 
offer a clear narrative about developing countries prevailing in the face of 
resistance from developed countries.  The countries given preferential treat-
ment by the EU were in some cases least developed economies, and the EU’s 
ultimate compliance with the settlement is still likely to harm banana produc-
ers in those countries.  This may change commentator sympathies about the 
distributional effects of the outcome, if not on the ultimate legal question of 
what would constitute compliance.  Nevertheless, the case forged a path—
one that seemed desirable to other developing countries, in addition to aca-
demics. 
B.  United States—Gambling 
The DSB has authorized Antigua to suspend its obligations under 
TRIPS to holders of intellectual property rights as a result of the United 
States’ prohibition on online gambling.  Online gambling is the second-larg-
est employer in Antigua, after tourism.168  In 2003, the United States began 
blocking online gambling sites hosted in Antigua, consistent with its federal 
                                                          
 166.  Ecuador requested consultations with EU under Article 21.5 of DSU; the Compliance 
Panel concluded that the EU’s unilaterally reformed banana regime was inconsistent with its WTO 
obligations under Articles I, II and XIII of GATT, a decision upheld by the WTO Appellate Body 
in November 2008.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 478, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU (adopted Nov. 26, 
2008) (upholding panel’s finding of violations of Art. II and Art. XIII of GATT). 
 167.  Historic Signing Ends 20 Years of EU-Latin American Banana Disputes, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/disp_08nov12_e.htm; EU 
and Ten Latinamerican Countries End 20-Year ‘Banana Dispute’, MERCOPRESS (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://en.mercopress.com/2012/11/09/eu-and-ten-latinamerican-countries-end-20-year-banana-dis-
pute. 
 168.  Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online Gambling Dispute, J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 
1, 2 (2009).  
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and state anti-racketeering laws prohibiting cross-border gaming services.169  
Indeed, the United States issued an arrest warrant against Jay Cohen, founder 
of World Sports Exchange, who owned an American gambling site in Anti-
gua.170  Antigua challenged various provisions of U.S. law as inconsistent 
with its obligations under GATS.171 
Specifically, Antigua argued that the U.S. prohibitory measures were in 
violation of “market access” rules provided under Article XVI:1 of GATS by 
allowing domestic companies to offer online gambling services to U.S. citi-
zens while prohibiting overseas Internet gambling services from Antigua.172  
Antigua further contended that this resulted in a “total prohibition” of Anti-
gua’s cross-border supply of services in the United States, a “limitation on 
the number of service suppliers” and “limitation on the total number of ser-
vice operations”173 in violation of Article XVI:2 of GATS.174  In addition, 
Antigua argued that such restrictions constituted a “total prohibition” of the 
betting services and hence, amounted to a “zero quota” limitation, which was 
again prohibited by Article XVI:2 of GATS.175  Lastly, Antigua claimed that 
the United States treated domestic and foreign service suppliers unequally, 
amounting to a “national treatment” violation under Article XVI:1 of GATS, 
which obligates every WTO member to treat the service suppliers of its own 
country and those of other member countries equally.176  In response, the 
United States argued that it had not made commitments with respect to gam-
bling services, and that a lack of numerical format in its provisions meant it 
was not a limitation on the number of service providers.177  Additionally, it 
argued that its anti-racketeering laws fit the “public morals” exception pro-
vided for under Article XIV of GATS.178 
                                                          
 169.  In particular, Antigua challenged the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act as inconsistent with U.S. obligations under GATS.  Panel Report, United States – 
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 3.93, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS285/R (adopted Nov. 10, 2004). 
 170.  Hartley Henderson, Antigua Offers a New Proposal to End Internet Gambling Dispute with 
U.S., OFF-SHORE GAMING ASSOC. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.osga.com/online_gaming_arti-
cles.php?Antigua-offers-a-new-proposal-to-end-Internet-gambling-dispute-with-U.S.-
14330#.VYB5QflVikp (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).  
 171.  Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services, ¶ 3.28, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Nov. 10, 2004). 
 172.  Id. ¶¶ 3.124–25. 
 173.  Id. ¶ 3.125. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. ¶ 3.134. 
 176.  Id. ¶¶ 3.129, 3.150. 
 177.  Id. ¶¶ 3.126–27.  
 178.  Id. ¶¶ 3.278–79. 
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The WTO panel held that the federal laws prohibiting online gambling 
services violated both the market access rules and the national treatment ob-
ligation provided under GATS.179  The public morals defense was rejected 
on the ground that the United States failed to demonstrate a total ban on all 
forms of internet gambling, such as those allowed under the Interstate Horse 
Racing Act.180  The United States was unwilling to bring its laws in compli-
ance with its commitments under GATS. Instead, the United States an-
nounced its intentions to modify its GATS schedule—a process unique to 
that agreement—and exclude gambling services from its commitments.181 
Following the panel decision, Antigua requested authorization to im-
pose countermeasures under GATS and TRIPS in an amount of $3.4 bil-
lion.182  The arbitrators agreed that it was not “practicable or effective” for 
Antigua to retaliate within the same sector as the original violation, as that 
would require a suspension of entertainment services and result in harm to 
Antiguan citizenry through higher prices for and potential deprivation of en-
tertainment options.183  The great imbalance in trading positions of the two 
countries was a key to their determination that cross-retaliation was appro-
priate—as with Ecuador, Antigua is a country with a relatively low trade vol-
ume, and the harm associated with retaliation would be much greater than the 
harm to the United States of increased tariffs for a very small portion of its 
exports.  The arbitrators authorized Antigua to suspend the obligations under 
the TRIPS Agreement at a level not exceeding $21 million annually.184 
Antigua has periodically announced its intention to suspend U.S. copy-
rights in the music and film industries.  In 2013, the country announced its 
intention to operate a website that would sell works to its citizens, without 
compensation to the American rights-holders185 and set up a committee to 
oversee its plan.186  However, no such website has materialized.  The reason 
                                                          
 179.  Id. ¶ 7.2(b). 
 180.  Id. ¶ 6.600. 
 181.  Arbitrator Decision, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services, ¶ 1.5, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. ¶ 4.52. 
 184.  Id. ¶ 6.1; WTO Authorises Antigua to Move Forward on Retaliation in U.S. Gambling Dis-
pute, BRIDGES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-authorises-an-
tigua-to-move-forward-on-retaliation-in-us-gambling.  
 185.  W. John Eagan, Antigua & Barbuda Planning to Launch Piracy Platform, MALLOY LAW 
BLOG (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.malloylaw.com/blog/item/190-antigua-barbuda-planning-to-
launch-piracy-platform. 
 186.  William New, Antigua Creating Platform to Monetise Suspended U.S. IP Rights from WTO 
Case, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/10/24/antigua-creat-
ing-platform-to-monetise-suspended-us-ip-rights-from-trips-case/.  The committee recommended 
the establishment of a statutory body by the government of Antigua “to own, manage, and operate 
the ultimate platform to be created for the monetisation or other exploitation of the suspension of 
American intellectual property rights authorised . . . by the WTO.”  Id.  
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is unclear, though the Antiguan economy’s reliance on tourism from the 
United States and its fear of political retaliation from the United States pro-
vides a potential explanation.187  The Antiguan example demonstrates that, 
for countries that cannot credibly threaten to suspend intellectual property 
rights, cross-retaliation alone will not place a weak WTO member in a better 
position.  This calls into question the notion that intellectual property rights 
suspension will solve the problems of power imbalance that others have 
pointed out in the WTO remedial scheme. 
C.  United States—Upland Cotton 
Brazil and the United States are both major producers and exporters of 
cotton, though their respective shares of the worldwide market have fluctu-
ated over the years.188  Following consultations in 2002, Brazil requested the 
establishment of a panel189 to adjudicate its claims that various U.S. govern-
ment programs were inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”) Agreement, the Agreement on Agri-
culture (“AA”), and Article XVI of GATT.190  The panel ruled that a number 
of U.S. programs were inconsistent with the agreements.191  The Appellate 
Body upheld nearly all of the panel findings in 2005, and made recommen-
dations for the United States to bring its programs into compliance.192  The 
                                                          
 187.  See Henderson, supra note 170 (speculating that “the island continuously refused to use 
that ruling fearing retaliation by the American government against the island in the area of tourism 
bans, which would have completely devastated their economy”).  
 188.  ERS Report CWS-11d-01, Brazil’s Cotton Industry Economic Reform and Development 
(U.S.D.A. 2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/111523/cws11d01_1_.  In 1999, the country had 
119 licensed operators employing around 3,000 people.  Joseph M. Kelly, Clash in the Caribbean: 
Antigua and U.S. Dispute Internet Gambling and GATS, 10 GAMING RES. & REV. J. 15, 15 (2005). 
 189.  Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/R 
(adopted Sept. 8, 2004).  
190. See id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.1, 2.2.  The report describes the challenged programs as follows: 
[P]rohibited and actionable subsidies provided to United States producers, users and/or 
exporters of upland cotton, as well as legislation, regulations and statutory instruments 
and amendments thereto providing such subsidies (including export credit guarantees), 
grants, and any other assistance to United States producers, users and exporters of upland 
cotton.  They include measures referred to as marketing loan programme payments (in-
cluding marketing loan gains and loan deficiency payments (LDPs)), user marketing 
(step 2) payments, production flexibility contract payments, market loss assistance pay-
ments, direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, crop insurance payments, cottonseed 
payments and export credit guarantee programmes . . . .  
Id. ¶ 2.2 (footnotes omitted).  
 191.  Id. ¶ 2.1. 
 192.  Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 5, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS267/AB/R (adopted Mar. 3, 2005).  The Panel recommended the withdrawal of prohibited 
subsidies such as the export credit guarantees and step 2 payments and the removal of adverse ef-
fects or withdrawal of price-contingent subsidy measures.  See id. ¶ 4.  
RajecFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  4:57 PM 
2016] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOSTAGE 207 
United States subsequently made some changes to its programs, spurring fur-
ther challenges from Brazil and another panel report193 and Appellate Body 
decision194 upholding many of the panel’s findings of continued violations. 
In 2005, after the first Appellate Body ruling, Brazil sought to retaliate 
against the United States for its continuing violations and arbitration was in-
itiated.195  During the second set of proceedings, the arbitration was sus-
pended but it resumed in 2008.196  Brazil sought permission to cross-retaliate 
by suspending concessions under TRIPS and GATS to compensate for $3 
billion worth of loss.197  Brazil based its request on the potential damage to 
its own consumers that would result from imposing tariffs on ninety-five per-
cent of the U.S. imports into Brazil, including many of its medical, educa-
tional, and food supplies.198  The arbitrators determined that Brazil could sus-
pend obligations under TRIPS after the allowable countermeasures in tariffs 
reached a certain threshold each year.199  Brazil subsequently announced its 
intention to impose countermeasures up to $829 million on U.S. goods, in-
cluding $268 million for cross-retaliation in pharmaceutical patents.200 
The threat of suspension of the rights of U.S. patent holders on certain 
pharmaceutical companies comes with real heft.  Brazil is a major market for 
pharmaceuticals, but it also has a strong domestic industry.201  The govern-
ment has supported the domestic pharmaceutical industry through a variety 
of investment policies, while also promoting policies that allow for greater 
access to medicines for its population.202  As a result, the domestic industry 
supplies a large portion of the domestic market, but the portion supplied by 
foreign manufacturers—with patented drugs—is of significant importance to 
U.S. drug makers.203 
Despite the long and involved legal process, Brazil has not suspended 
intellectual property rights.  And the United States has not eliminated the 
                                                          
 193.  Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Brazil, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/RW (adopted Dec. 20, 2007).  
 194.  Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/AB/RW (adopted June 2, 2008). 
 195.  Arbitrator Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 5.102, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS267/ARB/2 (adopted Aug. 31, 2009). 
 196.  Id. ¶ 1.22. 
 197.  Id.  
 198.  Id. ¶¶ 5.116–17.  
 199.  Id. ¶ 6.3.  
 200.  Ryan Conroy, Looking Back on the U.S.—Brazil Upland Cotton Dispute, POLITIK PRESS 
(Feb. 17, 2014), at 14.  
 201.  Protectionist Measurements Guard Domestic Pharmaceutical Industry Growth, 
EMERGING MARKETS ONLINE, WLNR 25088643 (Oct. 7, 2013).  
 202.  Id.  
 203.  See id. (“[A]ccording to Brazil’s local media Valor Economico, by June 2013 half of the 
Brazilian pharmaceutical sales were generated by domestic manufacturers.”).  
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inconsistent measures.  Instead, the countries have come to a private settle-
ment.  In 2010, the United States agreed to pay Brazilian cotton farmers 
$147.3 million per year while the countries continued to negotiate.204  In Oc-
tober 2014, the countries finally settled the dispute entirely through a one-
time payment, by the United States, of $300 million to the Brazil Cotton In-
stitute.205  The Brazilian story does not show compliance, nor does it show a 
temporary relaxation of intellectual property rights that may be used to pro-
vide access to medicines to those who need them.  In contrast to the Antiguan 
story, however, it does demonstrate the use of cross-retaliation to garner a 
financial settlement, thereby serving a compensatory purpose. 
III.  EVALUATING CROSS-RETALIATION THREATS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
These case studies demonstrate that cross-retaliation is not operating to 
achieve either the compliance or the compensatory purposes of WTO reme-
dies, and that cross-retaliation is only moderately useful as a means of provid-
ing monetary compensation for breaches through settlement.  Particularly, 
cross-retaliation will not solve the difficulty of achieving relief for countries 
that suffer a great power-differential against a noncompliant country and are 
unable to mount a credible threat of intellectual property rights suspension.  
In this way, the cases show that cross-retaliation may suffer from the same 
problems as other means of enforcement.  At the same time, cross-retaliation 
through the TRIPS Agreement has costs to intellectual property rights that 
have not been fully accounted for in prior discussions, which have primarily 
focused on perceived benefits.  Cross-retaliation operates in ways that are at 
cross-purposes with international intellectual property goals and presents a 
number of practical difficulties as well.  As a result, the limited benefits as-
sociated with cross-retaliation must be weighed against these potential costs. 
A.  The Trade Perspective on Cross-Retaliation Through Intellectual 
Property Rights Suspension 
From a compliance theory viewpoint, cross-retaliation appears far less 
appealing in practice than in theory.  Of the three cases, EC–Bananas III is 
the only case that arguably resulted in compliance, although it was actually a 
settlement with negotiated acceptable tariff treatments in the future.  It took 
                                                          
 204.  Editorial, U.S.–Brazil Cotton Deal Perpetuates an Unhealthy Status Quo of Subsidies, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-brazil-cotton-deal-per-
petuates-an-unhealthy-status-quo-of-subsidies/2014/10/07/d8346bf4-4b2a-11e4-891d-
713f052086a0_story.html. 
 205.  News Release, United States and Brazil Reach Agreement to End WTO Cotton Dispute, 
USDA (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?conten-
tid=2014/10/0219.xml. 
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fifteen years to get that agreement, meaning that the potential for cross-retal-
iation did not appear to create a sense of urgency with regard to compli-
ance.206  In addition, because other retaliatory measures were at stake from 
the United States and from Ecuador besides retaliation under the TRIPS 
agreement, it is not clear which of these threats resulted in the compliance—
if any.  It is entirely possible that Europe’s eventual capitulation stemmed 
from other considerations wholly unrelated to remedial threats, such as rep-
utation and reciprocity.207 
Similarly, the two more recent cases did not, by any measure, result in 
compliance with WTO rules.208  In the United States-Gambling dispute, An-
tigua is still waiting for relief from its claim and continues to threaten sus-
pension of United States copyrights.  This threat, however, has not mobilized 
lobbying forces in the United States sufficiently to result in compliance with 
the WTO ruling or in a settlement approximating monetary damages.  Anti-
gua, moreover, is a developing country with an economy tens of thousands 
of times smaller than the United States.209  This is one situation in which 
cross-retaliation appears—at first blush—to be a desirable alternative to other 
types of trade retaliation.  Antigua’s relative weakness means that traditional 
retaliatory measures are unlikely to be effective in forcing compliance.  How-
ever, in this case, cross-retaliation did not change the story.  This could be 
for a few different reasons. For example, it could be that Antigua is unable to 
withstand diplomatic pressure from the United States and would rather pre-
serve a good relationship than implement this remedy.210  Or, perhaps Anti-
gua does not have the technological capability to allow for a purely domestic 
distribution of copyrighted goods.  A system for distribution of copyrighted 
work would certainly take some investment to implement.  If the United 
States were to change its laws or offer a desirable settlement, Antigua would 
then have to discontinue its distribution.  One likely explanation for Anti-
gua’s delay in carrying through the threat, then, is that the country is antici-
pating such a settlement offer and would rather settle the matter without in-
vesting in carrying out its threat if possible.  And why hasn’t the United States 
complied?  It may be that the views of the United States on online gambling 
                                                          
 206.  See supra Part II.A.  
 207.  See supra Part II.A. 
 208.  See supra Part II.A–B.  The United States actually formally withdrew gambling from its 
GATS commitments, which means that it is now compliant with its commitments.  While GATS 
allows for opt-outs, other agreements do not.   
 209.  Based on data from the World Bank, showing that the Gross Domestic Product of Antigua 
and Barbuda is $1.221 billion, compared to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product of $17.42 trillion.  
Antigua and Barbuda Data, WORLDBANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/antigua-and-barbuda 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2016); United States Data, WORLDBANK, http://data.worldbank.org/coun-
try/united-states (last visited Jan. 22, 2016). 
 210.  See supra text accompanying note 187 (discussing Antigua’s fear of a tourism ban by the 
United States). 
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are so strong—whether by conviction or by lobby—that it is legislatively un-
able to change its law.  This may be one of those cases where compliance is 
simply not possible.  Still, it is noteworthy that in addition to its refusal to 
comply, the United States has also not come to a settlement agreement with 
Antigua.  Perhaps the United States realizes that Antigua’s threat is not via-
ble.  Whatever the reason for the stalemate, the threat of cross-retaliation 
through suspension of intellectual property rights has not compelled the 
United States to comply.  Moreover, the possible explanations are general-
izable to other small economies. 
Similarly, the United States-Upland Cotton dispute did not result in 
compliance by the United States.  Brazil’s credible threat to the U.S. phar-
maceutical industry resulted in pressure on the American government.  How-
ever, the considerable lobbying power of the cotton industry that received the 
illegal subsidy and the gridlock that has characterized the American Congress 
together made compliance politically impossible in the United States.  As a 
result, the United States is now subsidizing both American and Brazilian cot-
ton farmers—the former through the various challenged subsidy programs, 
and the latter through a monetary payment to a fund intended for disburse-
ment to Brazilian farmers.  In contrast to Antigua, Brazil’s threat of cross-
retaliation spurred a financial settlement, but was not effective in spurring 
compliance. 
Noncompliance in the Gambling and Upland Cotton cases may be ex-
plained by any number of factors.  One compelling explanation for both cases 
comes from Rachel Brewster, who shows that the United States is most likely 
to comply with WTO rulings when compliance may be achieved through ex-
ecutive action and least likely when compliance requires congressional ac-
tion.211  Brewster’s work suggests that cross-retaliation—or any type of rem-
edy—may be more or less effective at inducing compliance depending on the 
institution in charge of noncompliant laws.  This explanation also suggests 
why it may be difficult to calibrate remedies to encourage only minimal 
breach.  Congressional inability or refusal to change laws in order to comply 
with WTO rulings may merely reflect a collective action problem, where no 
one lawmaker wants to be seen as an enemy to the industry benefiting from 
noncompliance.  At the same time, congressional inaction could just as well 
be characterized as a reflection of domestic values that is not properly repre-
sented in the treaties negotiated by the executive branch.  In other words, 
Brewster’s insight into congressional inaction could support both a conclu-
sion that Congress is unable to determine when it is expedient to breach—or 
that failure to comply is a reflection of Congress identifying precisely the 
situations when breach is expedient and unavoidable.  But, even if these cases 
                                                          
 211.  See Brewster, supra note 16.  
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show instances of Congress making rational determinations about the value 
of breach, cross-retaliation does not greatly aid in making this determination. 
Furthermore, from a compensatory damages viewpoint, cross-retalia-
tion delivers less in practice than in theory.  Cross-retaliation was potentially 
attractive because it allowed for pricing compliance—or pricing breach—
when complaining countries were otherwise unable.212  In particular, for 
countries that are unable to retaliate because the retaliation causes more dam-
age to their industry than to the violator country’s industries, cross-retaliation 
through intellectual property was seen as a way to impose the cost of breach 
on the noncompliant country at little cost to—and with potential benefit for—
the complaining country.  In addition, because countries could still negotiate, 
cross-retaliation served as a potential stand-in for financial damages.213 
Although United States-Uplands Cotton did result in monetary compen-
sation, this was only when the complaining country posed a credible threat 
to U.S. holders of intellectual property rights.  Although a developing coun-
try, Brazil is a significant market for the United States. And while its decision 
to suspend intellectual property rights may have galvanized the United States 
to settle, Brazil was also authorized to suspend other trade concessions as 
well.  In this case, patent rights served as another lever for a country that 
already had some weight in its negotiations with the United States.  Of course, 
the threat of suspending pharmaceutical patents was significant to an im-
portant U.S. industry, but Brazil was only able to exercise its influence on the 
United States because of the size of its markets to begin with.  So, while the 
threat of intellectual property rights suspension may have helped Brazil to 
obtain compensation for the trade distortion it suffered, this result cannot be 
generalized to other developing markets searching for a means of collecting 
compensation for another country’s breaches of WTO law.214  This means 
that for least developed and developing countries, cross-retaliation may not 
                                                          
 212.  See id. at 261–63, 265.  
 213.  See supra note 142. 
 214.  This raises another potential problem with cross-retaliation from the efficient breach view-
point: the size of the negotiated settlement is likely to mirror the value of the intellectual property 
rights to the noncompliant country, not the size of the harm to the complaining country.  Theoreti-
cally, these values should be the same, because the rights-suspension is keyed towards the value of 
the initial violation.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.4.  However, this form of retaliation layers approx-
imations upon approximations.  Determination of the initial harm is not a precise science.  See 
Grossman & Sykes, supra note 16, at 143–45 (discussing the methodology for calculating harm 
done to Brazil by illegal subsidies).  This approximation (that is part of all countermeasure proceed-
ings at the WTO) must then be followed in cases of cross-retaliation by determining an equivalent 
amount of harm through suspension of some number of patents for some amount of time.  This 
double approximation likely results in a less accurate calculation of what should be compensatory 
damages than countermeasures that are imposed through tariff increases, and is problematic because 
the theory of efficient breach relies upon setting the cost of breach correctly, thereby ensuring that 
the set remedy neither over- nor under-encourages breach. Id. at 149–50.  But see Abbott, supra 
note 11, at 561–62 (suggesting that valuation of IP assets is not unusually difficult). 
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be as useful of a tool as some have suggested because it is most useful for 
those that provide a large market.  There are other, practical reasons why 
mounting a credible threat of cross-retaliation is likely limited to a relatively 
small number of developing countries that are discussed in more detail be-
low.215 
The problem with cross-retaliation, then, from either point of view, is 
that it is unlikely to give leverage to countries that otherwise have none.  Un-
fortunately, this was one of the strongest arguments in favor of the use of 
cross-retaliation.  In the case of Brazil, retaliation was approved under the 
GATT, GATS, and TRIPS agreements, so part of the problem that was solved 
by cross-retaliation was that countermeasures under the violated agreements 
(GATT and SCM) would not allow for enough retaliation.216  And for Brazil, 
with its strong generic drug industry, the threat of suspending pharmaceutical 
patents was a strong one.  But least developed countries and those with weak 
economies are unlikely to have strong generic drug industries.  Instead, some 
developing countries that have relatively strong economies are the most 
likely to have strong generic drug industries.  Cross-retaliation may have 
some distributional benefits, then, but they are skewed towards those who are 
relatively well off to start with.  It is unlikely to bring great benefit to coun-
tries that cannot mount a credible threat due to the small size of their overall 
markets or to their underdeveloped industry, both of which can undermine 
the threat associated with cross-retaliation.  In the case of Antigua, the reason 
its threat is not credible may be that it simply relies on U.S. trade and good 
relations too much for it to make sense to impose the sanction.217 
In addition, for those suggesting that cross-retaliation would result in 
suspension of IP rights and that this would be beneficial to developing and 
least developed countries because of increased access to innovation,218 the 
cases to date give little support to this viewpoint.  In none of the three cases 
where intellectual property rights suspension was authorized was the remedy 
implemented, and access interests were not served by the threat of suspen-
sion.  There are likely diplomatic and practical reasons for this.  In terms of 
diplomacy, intellectual property rights suspension is a strong threat, and it 
may be that complaining countries have little interest in carrying through be-
                                                          
 215.  See infra Section III.B. 
 216.  Arbitration Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶¶ 6.1–6.5, WTO Doc. 
8WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31 2009); Arbitration Decision, United States – Subsidies on Upland 
Cotton, ¶¶ 6.1–6.5, WTO Doc. WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31 2009). 
 217.  For example, according to USAID, the United States gave $476,000 in aid to Antigua and 
Barbuda in 2012, $711,000 in 2013, and $512,000 in 2014, much of which was security assistance 
for the military and for narcotics enforcement.  Foreign Aid Explorer, USAID, https://ex-
plorer.usaid.gov/country-detail.html#Antigua and Barbuda (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
 218.  See supra note 145. 
RajecFinalBookProof 11/3/2016  4:57 PM 
2016] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOSTAGE 213 
cause of the potential chill in diplomatic relations or the potential for de-
creased aid.219  In addition, it is easier to impose, increase, decrease, and lift 
tariff-based retaliation than it is to impose intellectual property-based retali-
atory measures, making intellectual property rights suspension less flexible 
than tariff-based retaliation in diplomatic negotiations. 
There are also practical complications that accompany suspension of in-
tellectual property rights.  For tariff-based retaliation, the government of a 
complaining country implements the retaliation itself by collecting higher 
tariffs.  When suspending intellectual property rights, however, the complain-
ing country needs to recruit actors to capitalize on the suspended intellectual 
property rights, unless those with technological know-how and capacity al-
ready stand ready to do so.220  Either way, the actor must possess sufficient 
technological prowess to capitalize on the scientific or artistic innovations 
hitherto protected, whether that means developing generic versions of drugs 
that were previously only manufactured by the patent holder or developing 
an online platform to facilitate the distribution of previously-protected mov-
ies and music within the complaining country.  And because countermeasures 
of any sort may only be implemented until compliance is achieved, any in-
vestment necessary to exploit the intellectual property may be lost if and 
when the dispute is resolved.  The United States-Uplands Cotton dispute may 
have been the rare case where non-governmental actors could capitalize on 
the suspended intellectual property rights, due to Brazil’s strong generic 
pharmaceutical industry and its record of public-private partnerships in the 
drug industry.221  However, in United States-Gambling, Antigua was only 
able to make vague threats about an internet platform that would allow for 
sharing of copyrighted materials.222  It is unclear how much progress has been 
made on this project, if any, or how private actors in Antigua are being in-
duced to invest in such a project. 
B.  The Intellectual Property Perspective on Cross-Retaliation 
The potential benefits of threatening to suspend intellectual property 
rights—which I have argued are much smaller than imagined—come with 
costs and serious practical difficulties specific to the nature of the rights at 
issue.  For example, patent rights are effective because they provide certainty 
that investments in innovation will be protected for a discrete length of time, 
but the potential for intellectual property rights suspension limits that cer-
tainty.  As a result, in contrast to retaliation through raising tariffs, retaliation 
                                                          
 219.  See supra note 82. 
 220.  See Abbott, supra note 11, at 585 (“Capital investment based upon a regime that is subject 
to termination on short notice may not be advisable.”). 
 221.  See supra Part II.C.  
 222.  See supra Part II.B. 
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through intellectual property rights suspension has the potential to impose 
diffuse social welfare costs by decreasing incentives to innovate world-
wide.223  Increasing globalization also makes it difficult to constrain the costs 
of retaliation to companies “from” a single, offending country.  Last, cross-
retaliation also raises several practical problems unique to the nature of intel-
lectual property protection, such as the difficulty of valuation, the need for 
significant private action to implement the suspension, and the pressure to 
maintain a way to reverse the rights-suspension when the appropriate level 
of retaliation is reached or the violator country amends its laws.  These fea-
tures mean that while cross-retaliation may be a useful option for some coun-
tries, it is not an effective option for least developed countries with relatively 
small markets and relatively weak economies. 
One cost of a cross-retaliation regime is that the uncertainty associated 
with the potential suspension of intellectual property rights may result in 
lower investment in innovation—a cost with global externalities.  The utili-
tarian justification for intellectual property rights posits that the rights repre-
sent a balance between the public’s interest in access to innovation and the 
need to encourage future innovation by granting inventors and creators the 
right to exclude others from marketing goods that embody their creations.224  
Under such a theory, weakening intellectual property rights (through shorter 
terms, weaker remedies, or more exceptions, for example) will result in less 
innovation, while strengthening intellectual property rights will result in 
more innovation.  The threat of cross-retaliation through suspension of intel-
lectual property rights introduces uncertainty and is therefore a weakening of 
these rights.  A company cannot control this risk ex ante, because cross-re-
taliation is imposed as retaliation for violations under other agreements, by 
other industries.225  As a result, if credible threats of cross-retaliation become 
more common, we can expect lower investments in innovation.  One wrinkle 
to this cost is that it may be incurred even when intellectual property rights 
suspension is merely threatened, but not actually imposed.  This is because 
the threat alone can cause uncertainty that will make investment in innovative 
industries less attractive than investment elsewhere.  By allowing threats to 
intellectual property rights through cross-retaliation, uncertainty is reintro-
duced. 
A counter to the innovation-cost argument is that the uncertainty asso-
ciated with suspension of intellectual property rights is limited because of the 
                                                          
 223.  See supra note 139 (discussing the purpose of patent rights and its potential to increase 
investment in innovation, providing a social good). 
 224.  See supra note 140 (discussing the balance between access and innovation). 
 225.  This is not unique to cross-retaliation, as discussed in Section II.B, because the industry 
that suffers under retaliatory measures is generally not the industry that has benefitted from the 
initial violations.  See supra Section II.B.  
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low likelihood that a threatening country will carry out its threat.  In none of 
the cases discussed here were intellectual property rights suspended and there 
are reasons to think this trend may continue.  Instead, countries that can 
mount a credible threat will pressure noncompliant countries to settle.226  
However, another way to envision the potential cost to innovation of intel-
lectual property rights suspension is that innovative companies, faced with 
the threat of cross-retaliation, will need to divert further resources from re-
search and development to lobbying, either for the government to amend laws 
in violation and bring them into compliance, or for financial settlements.  In 
this way, innovative industries are deputized by the WTO dispute resolution 
system to enforce compliance, or at least minimize noncompliance with 
WTO rules in unrelated industries.  Whether directly or indirectly, cross-re-
taliation through intellectual property rights imposes some costs on innova-
tive and creative industries, although the scope of those costs so far is likely 
small.  Nevertheless, these costs may reasonably be assumed to impact the 
industries’ innovative and creative capacities. 
The costs of cross-retaliation do not end there, because there may be a 
ripple effect of costs to foreign investment and trade in industries that rely on 
innovation.  This is not a problem of how much is invested in innovative 
activity, but of where the investments are made geographically.  One com-
mon critique of the TRIPS Agreement at the time it was signed was that in-
tellectual property is not a free trade issue.227  However, the justification for 
including it in the WTO Agreement was that uncertainty and wide disparity 
in intellectual property protection served as a barrier to trade.228  Specifically, 
innovative companies would hesitate to invest in countries that would not 
protect their intellectual property.  In addition, there were prohibitively high 
transaction costs associated with figuring out whether the intellectual prop-
erty rights were sufficient in each of many jurisdictions.229  According to this 
view, the TRIPS Agreement encourages companies to do business globally 
by providing a baseline of protection in all member states, and reducing risk 
and the transaction costs of doing business. 
                                                          
 226.  The length of the dispute resolution process leading to implementation of intellectual prop-
erty rights suspension also is likely to reduce the perceived cost of such threats, so that one would 
not expect to see either a drastic or an immediate drop in investment in innovative industries upon 
the filing of a complaint at the WTO targeting the practices of an unrelated industry. 
 227.  GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF 
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 32 (2012) 
(casting the TRIPS Agreement as an intellectual property “tax” developing countries accepted in 
order to access other markets for trade). 
 228.  Brewster, supra note 11, at 51 (suggesting that developed countries set the stage for cross-
retaliation by linking intellectual property rights to market access issues in trade agreements during 
the WTO negotiations). 
 229.  Rajec, supra note 33, at 164. 
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Decreased investment in innovation, to the extent cross-retaliation is 
likely to drive such a decrease, is not necessarily a bad thing when it comes 
in the service of greater access.  The ideal level of innovative activity is a 
much-debated question, as is the appropriate balance between access interests 
and intellectual property rights protection.230  Thus, there may be circum-
stances in which decreased innovation is deemed worthwhile.231  Nonethe-
less, cross-retaliation is a very blunt tool for weakening intellectual property 
rights—if that is in fact what we want—particularly if the threats are never 
realized.  From an intellectual property law perspective, it would be unfortu-
nate to weaken incentives to invest in intellectual property without achieving 
greater access to innovative goods.  However, that is what happens if intel-
lectual property-reliant industries bear the costs of lobbying their govern-
ments to comply with trade commitments while countries that are harmed 
threaten, but do not suspend, intellectual property rights.232  Cross-retaliation 
represents a privileging of trade dispute resolution over intellectual property 
commitments, and the early results suggest that the returns—even in terms 
of trade dispute resolution—are not particularly promising. 
C.  Why Cross-Retaliation Threats in Intellectual Property Don’t Work 
(Well) 
It may seem surprising that cross-retaliation through intellectual prop-
erty rights suspension is not as successful in practice as it is in theory.  How-
ever, suspending intellectual property rights is different from imposing coun-
termeasures in a number of practical ways that do much to explain why this 
remedy falls short.  There are practical complications associated with sus-
pending intellectual property rights that make the remedy costly and difficult 
for many countries to implement—or even to credibly threaten implement-
ing.  These complications include the complexity of valuing intellectual prop-
erty rights, identifying which rights-holders to target, and inducing private 
actors to capitalize on the newly available market, even while recognizing 
that their authorization may be short-lived. 
The value of retaliatory intellectual property rights suspension—like 
any retaliatory measure—is limited by the requirement that retaliation be val-
ued at an amount equivalent to the impact of the protested measures.233  This 
                                                          
 230.  Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1067–69 (2005) (detailing the debate); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. 
L. REV. 65, 128 (2015) (detailing without taking a position on the appropriate level of incentives 
and suggesting potential methods of gathering relevant data to address the question).  
 231.  For instance, compulsory licensing. 
 232.  For a discussion of the difficulty of setting efficient levels of intellectual property protec-
tion that also account for trade concessions, see Rajec, supra note 33, 168. 
 233.  DSU, supra note 6, art. 22.4. 
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creates difficulties in intellectual property rights suspension that do not arise 
in tariff rate changes.  For example, Brazil received approval to suspend in-
tellectual property rights equivalent to a value of up to $268 million a year.  
But determining how greatly a company values protection of its pharmaceu-
tical products is more complicated than imposing tariffs under traditional 
countermeasures.  The value associated with suspending patent rights is com-
plicated to determine because it depends on the market demand for the prod-
ucts absent protection and the price of generic substitutes, which will reflect 
the cost of development and production to generic drug companies.234  Addi-
tionally, actions for retaliation under the WTO already require a showing of 
injury.  In other words, first the DSB must determine the harm imposed by 
U.S. cotton subsidies and then must determine the appropriate level of intel-
lectual property rights suspension that equals that level of harm.  In addition 
to doubling the complexity of damages calculations, cross-retaliation re-
quires a determination of which rights-holders to affect.  This raises several 
questions.  For example, if a copyrighted work of music is a collaboration 
between people in different countries, one of whom is from the United States, 
does cross-retaliation apply to the work?  Similarly, if a U.S. pharmaceutical 
company files foreign patents in the name of foreign subsidiaries, will it mat-
ter that the invention originated in the United States by a U.S. inventor?  What 
if the invention originated in a foreign laboratory, invented by an employee 
of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company?  The WTO has increased global 
trade and global manufacturing, and with that the world has seen a prolifera-
tion of multi-national corporations.  At this point, it is unclear how a country 
with authority to suspend U.S. intellectual property rights can limit harms 
associated with suspension of those rights exclusively to U.S. industries.  If 
there is a way, however, it seems clear that a sophisticated country will find 
it worthwhile to circumvent those limits through strategic offloading of pa-
tents and other methods of corporate structuring. 
One other clear difference between retaliation through increased tariffs 
and intellectual property rights suspension is that the first involves govern-
ment action that is relatively easily started and stopped by Customs, while 
the second requires private actors who are equipped to exploit newly-unpro-
tected intellectual property rights.  Those private actors must also be willing 
to support any startup costs required to exploit those rights, and maintain this 
willingness even though the suspension of rights is capped at a certain level 
and may be cancelled upon the violating country’s decision to bring its laws 
into compliance.235  This difference between retaliation through tariffs and 
retaliation through intellectual property rights-suspension is one explanation 
                                                          
 234.  Anyone who considers such calculations relatively simple ought to sit through damages 
arguments in patent infringement trials.   
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for why Brazil’s threats are more credible than Antigua’s.  Brazil has a thriv-
ing pharmaceutical industry, including a robust generic drug manufacturing 
industry that makes it uniquely suited to exploit suspending U.S. pharmaceu-
tical patents.  In fact, it is likely that beyond Brazil and India, there are few 
countries able to mount a credible threat in this particular area of innovation.  
But whatever the field, there are costs associated with bringing products to 
market beyond intellectual property rights-related costs.  These costs, such 
as product development, manufacturing, and marketing, are borne by private 
actors and not the government that has asked to implement them.  Thus, in 
order to effectively retaliate, Antigua would need to encourage or coordinate 
a platform for the distribution of U.S. copyrighted works.  And beyond the 
costs associated with making goods that embody the suspension of intellec-
tual property rights available, any private actor stepping into this role is sub-
ject to limits on their profits.  Similarly, there is a risk that the violating coun-
try will bring its laws back into compliance, thereby requiring the harmed 
country to reverse itself and begin protecting the rights again.  These risks 
likely make it difficult to find private actors willing to exploit the intellectual 
property rights at all, even when there are actors well-positioned to do so. 
This intellectual property perspective shows both that there are costs to 
intellectual property when cross-retaliation is approved and that there are 
costs associated with implementation of cross-retaliation, specific to the use 
of intellectual property, that make it less appealing than it originally appears.  
The practical costs may explain in part why threats to intellectual property 
have not resulted in a satisfactory result for Antigua and Barbuda. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property rights suspension has been hailed as a desirable re-
taliatory measure for small and developing countries facing violations by 
more powerful countries.  However, authorization for cross-retaliation 
through TRIPS has rarely been requested and authorized, and it has never 
been implemented.  The cases in which cross-retaliation under TRIPS has 
been approved serve to highlight its deficiencies.  An analysis of the three 
cases in which cross-retaliation was authorized demonstrates that it will not 
result in greater compliance, it is unlikely to solve the power imbalance prob-
lem in WTO remedies, and it is not a useful tool for solving problems such 
as lack of access to innovation.  This is not to suggest it can play no role.  
Cross-retaliation may work for some well-positioned developing countries. 
In such cases, cross-retaliation may serve as a blunt tool to gain monetary 
compensation otherwise not provided for in the WTO.  However, because it 
is subject to the same problems of power imbalance between countries as all 
WTO disputes, cross-retaliation does not fully satisfy either of the dual and 
dueling goals of compliance and compensation that scholars have identified 
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and promoted.  In addition, cross-retaliation through intellectual property 
rights suspension, if widely adopted as a strategy, may weaken intellectual 
property rights without providing greater access to innovation.  It is time to 
reexamine this practice that has been wrongly hailed as a solution to the re-
medial problems at the WTO.  It appears that this reexamination will favor a 
decreased—or at least not expanded—role for the remedy. 
